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The Origin of the Spanish Question
The so-sal led ** Spanish Question" arose because of 
the eharaeter of the regime now in power in Spain. Some 
members of the United Hâtions have deelared that the ori­
gin, habits, institutions and general conduct of the re­
gime headed by Oeneral Franco are incompatible with the 
principles of the Charter, and a result of this alleged 
incompatibility, Spain has been refused admittance to 
the United Nations. One group of member states was con­
vinced that the existence and activities of the Franco 
regime created international friction. However, the 
United States expressed its opinion that the question 
was not so important as it seemed. With this idea in 
mind. Secretary Acheson recently circulated a policy 
letter in which he held that owing to organized propa­
ganda and pressure, "the Spanish question has been magni­
fied by controversy to a position among our present day 
foreign policy problems which is disproportionate to its 
intrinsic Importance."^ Nevertheless, evidence seems to 
show that the matter is of great international concern.
Spain has been the cause of international tension 
since the revolutionary birth of the Franco regime In 
1936. The revolution, called by Franco a "counter revo-
(text 5 r -£ W t Sr- T r ^ T s ê e r S w y 'ieheion to sinator'Tom Oonnally, January 19, 1960.)
Department jst P.rJtM.% Release. January 19,1950.Achf
lution«” on July 14, 193#, when a email group
of the e m ^  seize# the government redlo etmtlon In the 
oity of Veleneie*^ It took three years for Freneo to 
oonsolidate hla position, tout toy the spring of 1939 it 
sea generally aooepto# that Franoo was master of Spain, 
and some states, inoluding the United States and Cireat 
Britain, aoeorded him offlolal reoognltion.
By 1939, too, the League of Nations was drawing 
its last toreath, end if the United Nations sen be sailed 
the ohild of the League, then the **Spanlah Question" is 
part of its inheritanse. The Spanish problem was first 
brought to the attention of the League in July, 193#.
At this time the League of Nations was in an unfortun­
ate oonditlon. The ineffeetual bmndllng of the "China 
Inoidant" and the Bthlopian affair had severely damaged 
the League's reputation. Now it was faced with perhaps 
an even more difficult situation. Now could the League 
protect Reputolioan Spain, protoably its firmest support­
er, and at the same time confine the conflict to Spain?^
® Norman J. Padelford, m l  MlülSr
smsL la §BAalab £1x11 Ian* i*
3 In Article 6 of the Spanish Republlcsn Constitu­tion, the Republic endorsed the Paris Peace pact; Arti­cle II prohibited the President from declaring war ex­cept under conditions laid down by the League Covenant.MAANm S£. £aU.̂ l9&l SSlâûSft,
The League, as the United Nations later, had trouble 
determining on what grounds It could claim jurisdiction. 
The Covenant of the League did not mention civil war, and 
It recommended that Its member states and the League organ­
izations refrain from Interfering In the domestic problems 
of individual states. However, Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Covenant permitted the League to deal with any "matter 
affecting the peace of the world," and Articles 10, 11,
12 and 16 gave It jurisdiction over any matter threaten­
ing international peace and over any dispute likely to
4lead to war. In the circumstances, the League of Nations 
apparently had the right officially to Intervene In the 
Spanish Civil War.
Six times during the course of the Civil War, the 
Spanish Republican government brought the Spanish prob­
lem to the attention of the League of Nations* The Re­
publican argument never changed: the war In Spain had
become an International war. Franco's rebellion was sup­
ported from the outside, and the Non-Intervention Accord 
of August, 1936 amounted to active Intervention on the 
part of the members of the Accord against the Republican 
government* To support these charges, the Spanish dele­
gation produced documents and photographs proving German 
and Italian intervention In Spain, including the famous
^ Padelford, on. cit.. 181.
The RepubXiean government urged the League to apply 
eanotiona ag^inet Italy and Germany to compel these two 
powers to withdraw their forces from Opain, but the League 
merely eadoraed the Non-Intervention Accord end the peace 
efforts of Great Britain and i^rsnce.® i epubllcan Spain 
was able to secure only two votes for Its propoeal, thoae 
of itself and the Soviet Union.
The League of Rations side-tracked action proposed 
the Spanish Republican government, usually at the insist­
ence of Great Britain and France wirio wanted to move care­
fully "in view of the international situation.Towards 
the end of the Civil tar, on October 1, 1938, the League 
did adopt resolutions offering the technical services of 
the League to relieve the sufferings of the civilian popu­
lation on both sides in Spain and setting up a consDission
This White Book made Mussolini very angry, not be­cause it established the proof of Italian intervention which he admitted, but because it revealed the poor mor­ale and the cowardice of Italian soldiers. It proved many eases of bandaged soldiers with no wounds, self- inflicted wounds, and wounded soldiers being over-escorted from the battlefield. Shortly after the publication of the White Book new army regulations were adopted by the Italian High Command in r>pain to punish Italian soldiers guilty of these crimes.
^ Padelford, o p. cit.. 188. 
^ Ibid., 188.
6
to suporvlse tho "withdrawal plan."8
Altogether the League of Nations failed to protect 
Republican Spain* but in justice to the League it should 
be remembered that it was never asked to intervene direct­
ly in the war but merely to curtail foreign aid to the 
rebels* In the League * as later in the United Nations* 
the Soviet Union and the western Allies were divided over 
the Spanish question* The Soviet Union wanted to adopt 
whatever measures were necessary to protect Republican 
Spain* while the Allies favored a more cautious course* 
(This was the period in which Ureat Britain end Prance 
were trying to court favor with Italy* as a possible de­
fense against Uermany.)
O Premier Negrin of Republican Spain had announced the decision of the Loyalist government to effect the with­drawal of all foreign volunteers from its armed forces and had asked the League to supervise the withdrawal. On October 1* 1938* the Council adopted a resolution author­izing the creation of an international commission to note the measures of withdrawal adopted by the Spanish govern­ment and the effectiveness of these measures. In its res­olution the Council stated that the League "does not assume any responsibility either for the method of withdrawal or for the destination given to the persons withdrawn." The Council* rather than appoint the members of the Commission directly, authorized the representatives of Great Britain, Prance, and Iran to select the Commission and be responsible for its dispatch to Spain* The membership was composed of General Jalander of Finland* Lieutenant Colonel Homo of Prance* and Colonel Molesworth of Great Britain. The Com­mission assembled on the Spanish border on Octobur 14* 1938, and proceeded to Barcelona where it began to oversee the withdrawal of foreign troops via Perpignan*Padelford, on. cit.. 140.
6
With the fall of Madrid, the League completely discard* 
ed the Spanish question, end In May, Franco withdrew 
Spain from the League of Nations.
May, 1939 was the last time the Spanish question re­
ceived the attention of the League. In September, 1939, 
came the Invasion of Poland and the beginning of World 
War II, a war that led to the creation of that "Grand 
Alliance" which was one day to create the United Nations. 
In a series of declarations, the members of this anti­
fascist coalition indicated their intention of forming 
a new world organization at the end of hostilities. But 
these declarations (the Atlantic Charter, the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals, and the Tehran Declaration) made no men­
tion of the Franco regime, the same regime this coali­
tion effectively barred from the United Nations three 
years later. The obvious reason for this ommlsslon was 
that during the first years of World War II the Allies 
considered It to be a matter of military expediency to 
keep Spain neutral, emd an open condemnation of the 
Franco regime would have defeated this purpose.
As World War XI drew to a close and victory for the 
Allies seemed more certain. Allied policy towards Franco 
became more outspoken. At the United Nations Organiza­
tional Conference in Sam Francisco, during the discussion
of the membership provlslo»» of the Charter by the Ooh- 
eral Provisions Committee, the Spanish question reappeared.
On June 18, 1946, Eollin of Belgium, the president of 
the Oeneral Provisions Gommlttee, called for diacussiori 
on Paragraph 6, Article 2, of the Charter which stated 
that:
Membership of the Organization is open to all peace- loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and which. In the judgement of the g Organization, are able and ready to carry them out.
Luis Qulntllla, the Mexican delegate, reminded the committee
of the views already expressed by the Mexican government
10on the Spanish question. Qulntllla made it clear that 
Mexico would accept this article only with the understand­
ing that it would exclude the defeated Axis governments 
and the governments Imposed on other nations by the arm­
ed forces of the Axis. He specifically mentioned Man-
^ Documents aL thfl United Mations Oonference International Organization. VlTlT.
At the Conference of Chapultepec In February,1946, Mexico had tried to persuade the hatin-Amerlean states to present a united front against the Franco regime at the San Francisco Conference, but the Letin- Amerlcan states failed to agree upon the subject. The Spanish Embassy claimed in 1947 that the failure of the Mexican Government at the Conference of ^hapultepec was a victory for Franco. The Spanish Embassy claimed tiiat "the American nations were faithful to the doctrine of non-intervention and to Its founders. Ho amount of red booty stolen from Spain could change the attitude of Pan- American delegates. America remained loyal to Monroe, Polk, Juarez and Marti." "How Russia uses the United Nations Against Spain". Wheels Within Wheels. Spanish Embassy, 1947.
8
ehuria, Japanese-controlled Chine, and Spain. The Mexi­
can delegate explained hie position by declaring that:
There wee a time while the costly fight was going on, when some of the powers directly concerned with the military conduct of the war placed-- or should I say, had to place-- practical reasons of security above logical conmitments, but fortunately through the untold sacrifices of the great nations compris­ing this Oonference, the war in Europe is won. Musso­lini is no more, and Hitler himself has disappeared. We can at long last speak uncompromisingly.
In other words, an open condemnation of Franco Spain 
would not now endanger the course of military operations. 
Qulntllla supported his accusations by reading telegrams 
of congratulation from Franco to Hitler and finished his 
denunciation with a ringing plea that Franco’s voice 
never be heard In United Hâtions Conference halls*
The Mexican resolution, though it named no speci­
fic nations and stated that membership in the United 
Hâtions was not open to those states whose regimes had
been established with the help of Axis military forces,
18was nevertheless partly aimed at Franco Spain. Eight
11 Documents st the United M ê l ons CoaOtreng^ m  %B-VI, IS).12 This resolution declared: "It is the understand­ing of the Delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of the Chapter III cannot be applied to the states whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the countries which have waged war agslnst the United Hâtions, as long as those regimes are in power. (Ibid., 20)
9
13nations spoke in favor of the Mexican resolution. Their 
support ranged in intensity from that of the Belgian dele­
gation, which merely voiced its approval, to that of the 
Soviet Union, which claimed that Franco had actively aid­
ed the other Axia powers in the slaughter "of millions of
14innocent, peaceful inhabitants*" The resolution was 
adopted by a unanimous vote and was inserted in the Com- 
mission’s report. Adopted by the San Francisco Conference 
on International Organization, the Mexican resolution 
was the first international action taken on the Spanish 
question since 1939.
In June, 1945, international attention was diverted 
from the San Francisco Conference to the coming Berlin 
Conference (Potsdam) of the "Big Three." Pro-Republican 
and anti-Franco forces saw a chance to further their 
cause against the Franco regime. They organized pressure 
groups end propaganda, and in July "The Friends of the 
Spanish Republic," a combination of liberals. Communists, 
and pro-Bepublican forces in the United States, sent Mr.
 ̂ 13 Ibid.. 26. (These nations were France, Australia, Belgium, the Ukrianlan Soviet Socialist Republic, the Bye­lorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the United States, Uruguay, Chile, and Sweden.)
Ibid., 2T.
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Trumen a wlra urging that the Berlin Conference be used 
as an occasion for joint action on Spain by the "Big 
Three,
The Conferences, held at the Celelllenhof Palace 
near Potsdam between July 17 and August S. 1946, were 
attended by the heads of the governments of Great Bri­
tain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Oeorges 
Bidault of Prance and Wang Shlh-Ghleh of China were In­
vited to sit In on the meetings. The main aim was the 
reaching of an agreement on the outstanding political and 
economic problems left In the wake of the European war.
In due time, the Spanish question was brought up by Stalin, 
and the three governments agreed upon the following declar­
ation:
The three Governmenta, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those states which have remained neutral during the War, and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.
The three Governments fe#l bound, however, to make It plain that they for their part, would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the help of t ^  Axle Powers, does not. In view of Its origins. Its nature. Its record and Its close association with the aggressor states, possess the Qualifications necessary nb justify such membership.lb
"The Shape of Things," The Ration. July 14, 1946,161.
"Spain," American Year Book. 1946. 113.
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This dselaratlon «as the first offioiaX aetlon taken 
by the now vietorious Allies speelfieally to oondemn the 
Spanish regime, and antl-Franoo forses assumed that if 
this estIon were followed by a break in diplomatie rela­
tions with Spain that Franso would be thrown out by the 
Spanish people* The western Allies, however, hesitated 
at that time to take more severe astion, probably fearful 
of another Spanish civil war*
Both the San Franeisoo Conference and the Potsdam Con­
ference led to great activity in the Pardo Palace where 
Franco called a meeting of his top advisers to discuss these 
"outrages*" Apparently it was there decided that the solu­
tion ts Franco’s problem would be to Camouflage the real 
character of the regime by convincing the world that Spain 
war undergoing a democratic reformation* Indeed, Spanish
propaganda had already been dedicated to this end sftnce 
IVT-B day* Later, in 1946, the Spanish Embassy directly
attacked the San Francisco Resolution and claimed that:
hany of the delegations arriving for the Conference came from war-torn countries; these were passing through difficult internal trials which distorted what might have been a dispassionate outlook* The San Francisco Conference was marked by partiality, by deep dislikes and war-born hatreds, by resent­ment and vengennse which at times was painfully obvious to the outsider*
m if.» 114*
"How Russia uses the Onited Nations against Spain," Wheels IJj£jaAli Wheels. 6*
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Spain has ainca assarted that at San Pranelaeo Internation­
al law was replaced by "a misuse of power” at the insistence 
of the Soviet Union and its satellites and that the Oharter 
is now nothing but a gigantic treaty of alliance against 
the non-member states.
The Franco government gave a similar defense to the 
accusations of the Potsdam Declaration* The Spanish claimed 
that Attlee was influenced ”by the electoral propaganda still 
rife in England” and that the Spanish problem was brcm^t to 
the council table by *Blg Chief Stalin.” Even so, the Pots­
dam Declaration worried the Franco government enough to 
cause it to issue the following answer to the charges:
Considering the unwarranted reference to Spain in the communique of the big three conference in Berlin, the Spanish State denies, as being both arbitrary and unjust, these references and considers them as having been caused by the propaganda campaign of the Red exiles and their foreign collaborators.^^
Even though the Potsdam Conference had dealt Franco a severe 
blow, the condemnation by the Big Three was not enough to 
bring about his overthrow*
The action against Franco in Berlin was followed by the 
Conference of Faria, called by Great Britain in August, 1945, 
to consider the "Tangier Problem.” Before World War II, the 
area of Tangier had been governed by an International Com­
mission made up of Spain, Great Britain and France. In
13
Jun« of 1940, however, Spaoieh troops had oeoupled the 
zone, and before the year was out Spanish laws were in 
foree throughout the area. Oreat Britain and Pranoe, 
though foroed to reoognize the Spanish oeeupation as da 
facto for the duration of the war, had refuaed to recog­
nize it as jure, and the United States gave it no recog­
nition w h a t s o e v e r . A t  the end of the war, the time had 
C(me to settle accounts with Franco on this issue. Apparent­
ly Great Britain had hoped that the Soviet Union would re-* 
main a mere spectator, but when invitations to the Confer­
ence of Paris were sent, the Soviet Union insisted upon a 
seat at the Conference table* Spain was to have been in­
vited but upon Russian demand was excluded.
The Conference, held in Paris from August 10 to August 
31, 1946, was attended by the representatives from the 
Soviet Union, Pranoe, Great Britain and the United States. 
On September 4, the United States Department of State an­
nounced that three resolutions had been adc^ted: first, 
that Spain was to evacuate Tangier at once ; second, that 
the sovereign rights of the Sultan of Morocco in the area 
around the city were to be restored; and third, that for 
a period of six months there would be a provisional Inter-
20 mInternational Affairs," Newsweek. July 16, 1945,
21 «Squeeze on Franco," Time. September 3, 1945, 25.
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national Commimaion sat up using tha pra-war ooauaission 
as a modal, and aomposad of tha sama mambare as tha pre­
war aommission; and at tha and of this six month period 
a new sonfaranoa would mast whieh would inoluda Spain a- 
mong its mambars* Tha Soviet Union, and perhaps the other 
mambars of tha Oonfaranoa of Paris, thought that within 
six months they would ba dealing with Franoo*s suoeassor,
gohanea tha inclusion of Spain in tha invitations#
Tha six month period passed, and Franoo was still very 
mush at the head of tha Spanish government, and no new oon- 
faransa was called# There was, however, another moral con­
demnation of the Franco regime by the western Allies. The 
United States, Franca, and Great Britain issued a joint 
declaration on March 4, 1940, which clarified their policy 
towards Franco S p a i n # T h e  declaration stressed two points: 
first, that tha governments of the three countries agreed 
that as long as General Franco continued in control in Spain, 
tha Spanish people "could not anticipate full and cordial 
relations with tha contracting parties;" and second, that 
the governments of the three countries had not intended to 
interfere in the internal affairs of Spain# The three 
governments declared that the Spanish people must work
22 86. 
23 
1946, 1
o*a Department sL State Press Release. No. 161, March 4,
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eut their own destiny and that they were opposed to any
measure whleh might provoke another revolution in Spain*
They expressed their hope that:
In spite of the present regime’s repressive measures against orderly efforts of the Spanish people to organise and give free expression to their politisai aspirations, the three (Governments are hopeful that the Spanish people will not again be subjeeted to the horrors and bitterness of civil strife*
The declaration also expressed the hope that the Franco re­
gime would sollapse peasefully*
The Prensh then closed their frontier to all Spanish 
traffie, and Franco countered by sending his Moorish troops 
to the Pyrenees* The French government was forced to this 
decision by the pressure of public opinion* French labor 
unions refused to work on any trains which crossed the 
Spanish border and held anti-Franco demonstrations over 
Franco's execution^ of some well-known Republican leaders. 
The Spanish government warned the French government that 
a break in diplomatic relations would cut off the flow of 
vitally needed Spanish supplies to France. The French 
government was careful to assure the Spanish that the clos­
ing of the border was not meant to be an unfriendly act and 
that the French government had been forced to close the 
frontier by domestic pressure*
42#
2“ Ibid.. 1.
2® "Th* International Sasne," Mawawaak. keroh 11, 1946,
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These ̂ three eondemnatione (the San Praneiaoo Heao- 
lution» the Potsdam Declaration# and the Three Power Joint 
Deelaration hy Dreat Britain» the United States# and Pranoe) 
were the only multi-lateral measuree taken against the Pran- 
eo regime before the question was brought before the newly 
organised United Hationa* But these three dealarations
' i .served as a guide to regulate the relations of the United
i
Rations with Spain*
At the time the i Spanish problem was introduoed before 
the United Nations# only twenty-two nations maintained dix- 
loamtio relations with Spain. These states# which includ­
ed the western Allies# favored a more eautious poliey to­
ward Franoo Spain than did the states that had broken off 
diplomatie relations with Spain* The policy of the western 
Allies was at all times modified by the fear of another civil 
war in Spain# a fear probably prompted by eoneern over the
8d Argentina 
Belgium Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba DenmarkDominiearn Republic mire
ml Salvador Oresee
The NetherlandsNorwayPeruFranceSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUnion of South Africa United States UruguayUnited Kingdom
(Report of the Special Sub-0ommittee on the Spanish Question# 
SaiJiUl agflclal st security Oouncll. 36. )
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possible fate of their eoonomlo Interests as well as by 
a desire to spare the Spanish people the horrors of anoth­
er elvll w a r . T h e  Soviet Union seemed to have been more 
Interested In upsetting the Franco regime than In sparing 
the feelings of the Spanish people.
These three pre-Unlted Nations declarations^ the Pots­
dam Declaration# the San Francisco Resolution# and the 
Three Power Joint Declaration, showed, at least, that the 
western Allies and the Soviet Union were In accord about 
one matter: that Franco Spain should not become a member 
of the United Nations*
^  The American textile Interests In Barcelona# and the Sngllah mining Interests (Rio Tlntc) would be definitely dlsrtqpted by another civil war. The gains of the American controlled telephone company In Spain# acquired through the wartime pinch of the oil flow, would be threatened by a civil war. A ccMsplete leftist victory might well bring the nationalization of all foreign Industries as In the Soviet Union, or partial nationalization as la Mexico and Iran. Another civil war would probably lead to Interven­tion by both sides and might well be the start of World War III.
18
Chapter II* Introduetlon of the Spanish Questionto the United Nations
These earlier statements of polley ( the Potsdam Dee-
i , 1  ; .
laratlon, the San Pranelaeo Resolution* and the Three Power
■ : .  ̂ ■ r i .V-* I ■ • \  - i t
Joint Deelaration of Great Britain, the United States* and
Pranee) had proved l^at the Allies neither favored the Franco
I ! ^
regime nor (In 1946) its admlttanee to the United Nations.
The memory of the part played hy Spain In World War II seemed 
likely to prevent It from joining the oommunlty of nations. 
Moreover* the relations between the Soviet Union and the 
western Allies had not yet beeome strained to the point 
where Great Britain and the United States would look upon 
Franoo Spain as a potential ally.
The United Nations Itself excluded Franoo Spain from 
membership at Its first meeting In London. In February *
1946* In the twenty-sixth meeting of the General Assembly* 
the Spanish question was Introduoed to the United Nations.
On February 9* 1946* the delegation from Panama proposed 
a draft resolution on the relations of member nations with 
Spain. The resolution as passed by the General Assembly 
read:
The General Assembly recalls:
That the San Franeisoo Oonferenoe adopted a reso­lution aooordlng to which paragraph B of Article 4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter can­not apply to states whose regimes have been In­stalled with the help of armed forces of countries
19
whioh have fought agaiaet the United Nations so long as those regimes are in power*
The General Assembly reealls:
That at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that they would not support a request for admission to the United Nations of the present Spanish Government *vhish having been founded with the support of the Axis powers. In view of its origin, its nature, its record, end its close association with the aggressor states' does not posses the necessary qualifications to justify its admission*
The General Assembly, In endorsing these two state­ments, recommends that the Members act in accord­ance with the letter and spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain.1
Nine nations spoke in favor of the motion: Mexico, the
United States, France, Yugoslavia, Norway, Venezuela, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the United Kingdom,
and Csechoslovakia. The most vehement speech was given by
one of the Soviet bios* Kuzma Sialev of the Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, referring to the activities of
the Blue Division, declared (technically incorrect) that
i ■ * ■
Franco Spain had been at war with his country and that 
Spaniards had killed women and children, buriedl people 
alive, and committed other atrocities* When the measure 
came up for vote, it received approval from all the members 
except El Salvador and Nicaragua* These two countries, who
A.ssemGenera  _February M
2 0
professed friendship for the Franco regime, voted against 
the resolution proposed by the delegation from Panama on 
the grounds that it countenanced Intervention In the in­
ternal affairs of Spain whieh the United Nations Charter 
forbade* The resolution, weak in not binding the members 
of the United Nations in their relations with Spain, merely 
reeommended that they follow the Potsdam and San Franeisoo 
statements when dealing with the Franco regime*
A much stronger proposal than the Panama resolution was 
introduced before the Security Council in April, 1946. Dr. 
Oscar Lange, the Polish representative, wrote the Secretary- 
General on April 0, 1946, informing Trygve Halvdan Lie that 
he had been instructed by his government to draw the atten­
tion of the Security Council to a situation "of the nature 
referred to in Article 34 of the C h a r t e r . T h i s  situation.
s The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the contiusnce of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and se* 
curity* ( G M E M r  o£ m a  Ur L ^  MS&ÂsmSInternational Court of ^^btice: Department ofPubli confor­mation, Lake Success, New York, 1946, Article 34, 16* Ar­ticles 36, 37, and 38 also give the Security Oouncll the right to take action to preserve the maintenance of inter­national peace and security through peaceful methods. The Oouncil may take coercive action under the authority of the Oharter, by invoking the measures called for in Articles 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44*)Quote was taken from the United Nations Official Records of 
JthSL Security SStiaall, Meetings IMg* 491.
sa
aeeording to Lange, was "due to the Internatlonaa frietlon 
resulting from the existence and activities of the Franco 
regime in Spain.
On April 9, the Polish request that the Spanish ques­
tion be placed on the agenda of the Security Council reach­
ed the office of the Secretary-General. The Polish govern­
ment also referred to the Panama resolution and added that 
the closing of the Spanish-French frontier had caused "in­
ternational friction" by providing a cause for conflict 
between Spain and Prance.^ The Polish government wanted 
the United Nations to adopt measures which would lead to 
the overthrow of the Franco regime. This could be done, 
according to the Polish government, under Article 2, para­
graph 6, of the Charter under which the United Nations had 
the authority to apply the principles of the Charter to 
non-member nations.^ The Polish delegation also asked the 
Security Council to take action under Articles 34 and 36 
of the Charter and to adopt any other measures necessary 
to bring about the collapse of the Franco regime#
The Polish request was read to the Security Council by
■* ifilda.. 491.
^ This paragraph stat.s that the "Unlt.d Hatlons shall insure that states not members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Organization." Ibid.. 491.
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Lemge on April 2-i, 1946. The members of the Council at 
that time were : Australia, Brazil, China, Bygpt, France, 
Mexico, Tha Netherlands, Poland, The Union of Soviet Social- 
lat Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States*
The delegate from Bygpt, Aflfi Paaha, was president* ®
The request of tha Polish government received widespread 
attention in the newspapers of the United States, and pres­
sure groups sent telegrams and memoranda supporting** the 
Polish request to the Becurlty Council. On the day before 
the Security Council met in New York, a memorandum on Spain 
(drawn up by the "Nation Assooiatea,a liberal association, 
and signed by the represoaNatives of eight national organ*
izatlons, including Philip Murray of the Q.I.O.) was sub-
7mitted to the president end members of the Oouncll. The 
Nation Associates wanted to show the Becurlty Oouncil that 
they favored Security Council action on the Spanish ques­
tion.
The Security Council unanimously agreed to place the 
Spanish question on its agenda for its thirty-fifth meeting 
on April 10, 1946. At thl^meeting, Lange reviewed the 
history of the Franco regime in Spain* The Polish delegate 
stated that it was a well known fact that the Spanish regime 
had been installed with Axis help, and to prove his conten-
^ Ibid.. 491.
^ **The Shape of Things," Nation. April 19, 1946, 428.
tion be eited telegrams of congratulation from Hitler to . 
Franco, letters written by Franco to MuBBOllnl and Hitler, 
end tbe United States White Book. Ho argued that the Franco 
government was a cause of international frlcti n, that Spain 
was e refuge for Kazis and former members of the Gestapo, 
and that Spain was not co-oparating with the Allied govern­
ments la their mttempte to recover German assets in Spain.
As a result of these Alleged facte, the Polish government 
wanted the Security Council to call upon all membere of 
the United Nations to break off diplomatic relatione with 
the Franco government and to encourage the Spanish people
oto overthrow the Franco regime.
Lange then introduced a resolution which he hoped would
lead to the collapse of the Franco regime :
The Sacur ity Oouroil declares that the existence and activities of the Franco regime in Spain have led to international friction and endangered the aeintanance of international peace and security.
In accordance with the authority vested in it, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, the Security Coun­cil calls upon all Members of the United Nations who maintain diplomatic relations with the Franco govern­ment to sever such relations immediately.
The Security Council expresses its deep sympathy to the Spanish people. It hopes and expects that the people of Spain will regain the freedom of which they have been deprived with the aid and contrlv* anee of Fascist Italy and Nasi Germany. The Secur­ity Council is cti^vlnodd that the day will come
® United Nations Official Records of tJhe Security Coun­cil . Meetings àd-gg. 1940. 549.
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when it will be able to eeloome the Spanish nag tlon Into the eommunity of the United Nations.
The Polish resolution was vigorously denounced by the 
Spanish government. Franco offered to let those states 
maintaining diplomatic relations with Spain send represent­
atives to Spain to investigate the Polish charges. These 
representatives would be allowed to circulate freely, 
“provided that once the Inaccuracy is proven, ample pub­
licity will be given the results of the visit.
There is no evidence of any attention paid to the offer 
in the United Nations, and a lively debate began over the 
Polish resolution. Alexandre Parodi of France gave his 
full support to the Polish Proposal and pointed out that 
the French government had already sent notes, in March, to 
the United Kingdom and the United State© in an effort to 
bring the Spanish question before the Security Council.
But these two nations had not agreed with the French gov­
ernment. Parodi said that the French government wanted 
the United Nations to take a definite stand on the Spanish 
question. He claimed that the United States and Great 
Britain had advanced unjustified objections: that the ex­
istence of the Franco regime did not create a threat to 
international peace and that, therefore, the Security
® Ibid., 660.
“Foreign Affairs,* Newsweek. April 22, 1946, 40.
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Council diù not h&ve jurisdiction; second, that the 
Spanish problem was no concern of the United Nations; 
third, that any action by the United Nations would only 
strengthen the dictatorship.^^
Francisco Caetillo Najera of Mexico also spoke In 
favor of the resolution, reaffirming his country’s de­
sire to see democracy return to hpain. Andreis A.
Gromyko of the Soviet Union also gave his support to 
the motion, warning the Security Council to be care­
ful lest it make tne same fatal miateke the League had 
made in sponsoring the Kon-Intervention System; Gromyko 
appeared to believe that the actions of the League had 
made Franco's rise possible and hao also contributed to 
the League's collapse.
Hot all of the countries were in favor of the res­
olution. The attitude of the United States was express­
ed by Edward Stettinius who said that the United States 
would not support any measure "likely to lead to civil 
war." Sir Alexander Oadogan of Great nritain stated 
definitely that the United Kingdom would not give its 
approval to the Polish resolution, because it believed 
that the regime was not creating a threat to international 
peace as the resolution claimed. He stated that apparently
icibl Records at t̂ ke Security Council. Meftijgga M - m »  ISSIT 606.
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Franco had thought that Hitler *a power was Irresistible 
and that Hitler would conquer the European continent, so 
Franco had wished to draw from that belief the best ad­
vantage he could for Spain* Sir Alexander intimated that 
Franco was not alone In making that mistake and called for 
a more thorough Investigation of the Spanish problem* The 
delegate from Brazil pointed out that It was not a part of 
the Security Council's function to Intervene in Spain's 
Internal affairs* He Insisted, also, that member states 
should consider non-intervention their only proper course* 
Hr* Van Kleffens of The Netherlands also voiced his dis­
approval of the resolution, arguing that diplomatic sanc­
tions adopted against Franco would only hurt the Spanish 
people.
The Council was hopelessly split on the Polish reso» 
lutlon when Colonel Hodgeson of Australia offered a com­
promise* He wanted the Council to create a sub-committee 
to Investigate the facts of the Spanish question and to 
make some recommendations* Colonel Hodgeson wanted the 
proposed sub-committee to answer three questions* First, 
was the Spanish question essentially within the jurisdic­
tion of the United Nations? (And thereby within the jur­
isdiction of the Security Council) Second, was the sit­
uation In Spain one which might lead to International 
friction? Third, was the situation In Spain likely to
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endanger the maintenance of international peace?
The Connell was unable to agree to this compromise 
until the United Kingdom, France, and Poland reached an 
agreement outside the Council hall, and it was not until
the next day that the Australian resolution, calling for
12the creation of a sub-committee, was adopted. Ten Coun­
tries voted for the proposal, and only Gr j w a o  of the 
Soviet Union refused to vote for the resolution. He 
asserted that there was no need for a committee of in­
vestigation and that his nation was absolutely opposed 
to compromise. But he would abstain rather than vote 
against it.
The president of the Security Council declared the
resolution adopted and appointed the delegates from
Australia, France, Brazil, ChJna, ami Poland to serve
on the "Special Sub-Committee to Investigate the Spanish
Question." Lange of Poland proposed that Hodgeson of
Australia be appointed chairman of the sub-committee,
13and the Council approved.
Ho evidence was accepted from the Franco governmernt. 
The sub-committee based its recommendations solely upon 
evidence submitted by member nations and the exiled 
Spanish Republican government. The members of the sub-
Ibid., 605. 
Ibid., 606.
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eommittse, of the opinion that the Spanish question was 
of International eoneern and therefore exceeded the do­
mestic jurisdiction of Spain, collected and listed data
14under eight headings.
1. The sub-committee was to determine the "origin# 
the nature, and the structure of the Spanish regime,"
Its general conduct, and the extent to which the Insti­
tutions and policies of the regime were compatible with 
the principles of the United Nations. The evidence ex­
amined by the sub-committee led It to believe that Franco * s 
success was mainly due to the assistance of the Axis pow­
ers. This assistance, according to the sub-committee, be­
gan on the first day of the rebellion, when Hitler sent 
Franco a Duetache Lufthansa plane for the historic flight 
from the Canaries to Tetuan, and continued until the fall 
of Madrid. The sub-committee pointed out that Hitler had 
admitted Intervening In Spain and quoted from Mussolini’s 
article In %% Popolo d*Italia of May 20, 1938 In which 
the Duce Is supposed to have written:
As for Spain, we have Intervened from the first to the last moment. Non, thousands of Italian off 1- cars have had experience on Spanish battlefields.^
"Report of the Sub-Coramlttee on the Spanish Ques­tion", United mtlons security Council Official Records. 1st Year, 2nd Series, Special Supplement, June, 1946, 1.
Ibid., 8.
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The «ub-oommlttee alao elted an art1ole from Stefanl. 
the official Italian news agency, to the effect that 
Italy had sent Franco 763 planea, 1,678 tone of bomba, 
and 9,860,000 rounds of ammunition. In short, the sub­
committee claimed that as long as all three leaders (Fran­
co, Hitler, and Mussolini) had admitted Axis aid to the 
Franco regime during the Spanish civil war that there was 
no question of whether the Axis had Intervened In Spain.
The sub-committee did not, however, determine what part 
this aid played In Franco's success*
The structure of the regime, decided the sub-committee, 
was patterned after the fascist governments of Italy and 
Germany.. In July, 1937, Franco had stated that:
Spain will have the structure of totalitarian regimes such as Italy and Germany.
According to the sub-committee, the general conduct of the 
regime had been similar to that of the fascist countries, 
and It claimed that the Palange, hlch was the sole Spanish 
political party, had adopted all the methods of the Germane 
and the Italians. The "Youth Fro nt wa s  the same as the 
organization of Mussolini's "Ballllas," and that the organ­
ization, supervision, and control of the press and education 
were under the authority of the state.
2. The sub-committee was to determine the attitude of
Ibid.. 9. (quoted from the Hew York Times. February 28, 1946.
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the Praneo regime during World War II toward the Aillea 
and toward the Axla. On this Item the aub-oommittee eom- 
mented that it seemed elear from numerous pronouncements. 
of Franco that Spain had supported the Axis oeuse; he had 
admitted on July 17, 1941, that:
The Axis is now a triangle comprising (Germany,Italy, and Spain.17
The members of the sub-committee were of the opinion that 
after the outbreak of war in Surope, Franco had prepared 
for Spain's entry on the side of the Axis. Moreover, the 
sub-committee listed the types of aid given the Axis by 
Franco: the Blue Division, the Salvador Air Squadron, the 
use of Spanish ports for submarine and air bases, and sec­
ret service aid. It also recalled that Franco had sent 
congratulations to the Japanese legation on the success­
ful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and had recognized 
the Japanese puppet regimes in China and the Philippines.
3. The sub-committee was to determine the extent to 
which the Franco regime continued to "harbour Oerman assets, 
enterprises and personnel, Nazi agents, organizations and 
war criminals and to tolerate their contact with Nazi end 
Fascist organizations outside of Spain."1^ The sub-commit­
tee estimated that German property In Spain had been worth
JÈlâi.. 18. (quot.d from Scnl.h Rapubllaan R.port) 
Ibid.. 23.
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95,000,000 dollars, tout that some of this property had 
toeen recovered toy the British and American Recovery Mis­
sions. It olalmea that Franco had co-operated In this 
recovery only under "constant pressure" and that there 
were still some 3,000 Qermans in Spain that could toe class­
ified as "obnoxious." It also charged that ex-Gestapo lead­
ers directed the external services of Franco's espionage 
system and of his Military Intelligence Service.
4. The sub-committee was to estimate the numerical 
strength of the armed forces of the regime. Including police 
and security forces, in relation to the population end 
resources of Spain and the strategic aims and purposes of 
these forces. The sub-committee estimated that the total 
armed strength of the Franco regime was 800,000 men, the 
total tonnage of the Spanish navy to toe 341,395 tons, and 
the total number of aircraft to toe 4ÔQ. The sub-committee 
decided that these armed forces were only for defense.
(The sub-committee also noted that these forces were poorly 
led, illequipcd, and of low morale.)
5» The sub-cono&ittee was to estimate the production 
of uranium and war materials and the extent of military 
and naval research.. It was admitted that Spain had six 
uranium mines, that Spain had not increased productivity 
in any important industry, end that Spain was not preparing 
for war#
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6* The eub-eommlttee w&s to investigate the poro©- 
eution of Hepublleans and other political opponent© and 
the execution, imprieonment, and police supervision of 
large numbers of the Spanish people. The total number 
of political prisoners in Spain eas estimated by the 
sub-eommltt^ee to be 35,000, and the sub-committee "took 
note" of the Spanish Republican claim that these prison­
ers were treated horribly. It also claimed that the pop­
ulation of Spain was under constant supervision, control, 
and terror as a result of the activities of Franco*a 
secret police.
7. The sub-committee was to investigate the detention 
by the Franco regime of nationals of other countries. The 
sub-committee declared that there were only sixty-six for­
eigners in Spanish prisons, and that the Spanish govern­
ment was anxious to get rid of them.
8. The sub-committee was to Investigate the pro-fascist 
activities of the Palange party and other Franco organiza­
tions outside of Spain. The sub-committee alleged that 
Spanish diplomatic officials had for years been encourag­
ing groups in the American republics to oppose intersAmer­
ican unity against the Axis powers during the last war.
In these eight groups, the sub-committee had merely 
repeated what had already been acknowledged by the United 
Nations: that the Franco regime was partly fascist in origin, 
character, and habit. The most significant part of the re­
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port «as th# seetlon on the Jurledlction of the Security 
Council. The eub-committee decided thet the Security 
Council could not claim jurledlctlon under Article Z9, 
elnee Spain was not creating a threat to the peace and 
security of the world* nor had It committed an act of 
a g g r e s s i o n . B y  this conclusion the sub-committee de­
clared that the Polish resolution was Illegal, because 
the resolution had sought authority for the Security Coun­
cil under Article 39. But the members of the sub-committee 
agreed that despite the Illegality of the Polish resolution, 
the seriousness of the situation in Spain warranted some 
action by the United Nations.
19 «Yhe Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken In accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." (United Nations Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter VII, Article 39, 17.)
"The Security Council may decide what measures not Involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may Include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of CMmunlcation, and the severance of diplomatic re­lations. ** (Ibid.. Article 41, 17.)
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provid­ed for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be Inadequate, it may take much action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore in­ternational peace and security. Such action may Include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." (Ibid.. Article 42, 17.) ”
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The sub-ooŒmlttee believed th&t the Security Council 
should claim jurlsdletl n under Chapter VI of the Char­
ter, which empowered the Security Council to examine **any 
situation which might lead to international friction,’* 
to determine whether the continuation of the situation
was **llkaly to endanger the maintenance of international
20peace eti d security.** Having now decided that the Secur­
ity Council had the right to take some kind of action. It 
remained for the sub-committee to discover what action 
the Council could take. The members of the sub-committee 
agreed, with the exception of Poland's Lange, that the 
Security Council should communicate the findings of the 
investigating group and Its own recommendation to the
deneral Assembly which would be able to claim jurladlc-
21tlon under the Charter*
In view of these conclusions the sub-committee made
three recommendations:
(a) the endorsement by the Beourity Council of the principles contained in the declaration by the
20 IXJW. . 16.
21 The General Assembly may discuss any question or matter within the scope of the Charter not on the agenda of the Security Council. However, it can only make recom­mendations; it can never command the member states to fol­low its recommendations. There is no veto in the General Assembly, and important questions have a better chance of being acted upon, since dec!eIons on such questions re­quire only a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.
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government e of the United. Stetee, the United Kingdom, end France, dated March 4, 1946:
(b) the transmitting by the Security Council to the Caneral Assembly of the evidence and re­ports of the sub-committee together with the recommendation thet unless the Franco regim^d was withdrawn and the other conditions of political freedom set out In the declaration were In the opinion of the Cenerel Assembly fully satisfied, a resolution would be pass­ed by the General Assembly recommending that diplomatic relations be broken off by each member;
(c) In the event that these conditions were ful­filled, Spanish application for membership In the United Nations would be honored.
Lange of Poland was the only sub-committee member 
who did not approve these recommendations, and he de­
clared that the eub-committee had ignored the legal 
jurisdiction of the Security Council.
The report was finished, published, and distribut­
ed by June 6, 1946, six weeks after adoption of the 
April resolution. It constituted the most Important, 
certainly the most positive, action of the Security 
Council on the Spanish problem, but was admittedly a 
summation of old charges against Spain, and not the re­
sult of an Impartial Investigation or search for new 
evidence. It brought to light the very definite divi­
sion among the members of the Council. As for the Polish
Ibid..
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resolution. Franc©, th© Soviet Union, Poland, and 
Mexico supported it, «A lie i:he United States, the Unit­
ed Kingdom, Ohlns, and Brazil withheld their approval 
on the drounds that the proposed action would have amount­
ed to intervention in the domestic affairs of another 
state, Australia played the role of compromiser*
When the Council voted on the Australian compromise, 
that is, on whether to refer the question to a sub-com­
mittee for "iaveatigationV» only the Soviet Union refrain­
ed from voting. The Soviet Union exercised its right of 
abstention on the grounds that the formation of a sub­
committee was unnecessary, for the Council already knew 
the facte end any such investigation would delay action 
on the Spanish question* The split was less evident in 
the work of the sub-committee, although there was a slight 
disagreement over the question of the Security Council*a 
jurisdiction, with Poland claiming that the Security 
CouBcil had the right to make whatever decisions, to 
take whatever action, it deemed necessary*
The name given to the sub-committee by the Security 
Council has led to a mletaken belief thet the eub-com- 
mlttee was a special group of experts, unbiased and well 
qualified. In reality, it was no more then a group of 
members of the Security Council (possessing the same dis­
likes as in the Council) who had retired to a smaller
TOOK to reach e eoBtî roialse on a quofirion th^y had been 
unable to agree upon in the larger Security Council. 
This compromise was reached without regard to the baalc 
issue6 involved* whether the Franco regime was creating 
a threat to international peace and whether the Epenlsh 
people were being deprived of their freedoms in viola­
tion of the principles of the Charter- Only once had 
the Council even mentioned asking for expert opinion, 
end whan the United Kingdom had made this suggestion, 
it was quickly passed over. Each country, or group of 
countries, seemed determined to protect its own inter­
ests without thought of the purposes and principles of 
the Charter.
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Chapter III. The Stalemate In the Security Councilover the Spanish Question
The report of the a pedal subcommittee appointed by 
the Security Council to investigate the Spanish question 
had confirmed the alleged guilt of the Franco regime. It 
also had recognized the right of the Security Council un­
der the authority of the Charter to "take action on the 
Spanish question." The Security Council received the 
sub-committee report on June 6, 1946 at Its thirty- 
seventh meeting. The membership of the Council had not 
changed, but Alexandre Parodi of France had replaced the 
Bygptlan delegate as the Council president.
The president reminded the Council that the special 
sub-committee had been appointed to examine the Spanish 
question. He requested Dr. Hugh Bvatt of Australia, the 
new chairman of the sub-committee, to make his report. 
Bvatt did not read the report of the sub-committee, since 
It had been distributed to the delegates, but merely re­
called the sub-committee's recommendation that the United 
Nations should endorse the principles of the Three Power 
Joint Declaration of March 4, 1946. Bvatt felt that the 
big question was how to apply these principles, and he 
urged the Council to give Its full support to the recom­
mendations of the sub-committee. These Included a recom­
mendation for the severance of diplomatic relations by all 
member states of the United Nations with Franco Spain 
which Bvatt defended by saying that:
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it iB e form of aotion within the control of the individual nation, and a common form of expressing international disapproval.^
He claimed that since the Security Council had already 
expressed its disapproval of the Franco regime, a sever­
ance of diplomatic relations by the members of the United 
Nations with Spain would toe a natural result of the Coun­
cil’s views. The Australian delegate argued that as long 
as the United Nations would not admit Franco Spain to 
membershipa no member of the United Nations should main­
tain diplomatic relations with the Franco Government.
Evatt further reminded the Council that the sub-com­
mittee had decided that the situation in Spain was not 
creating a threat to international peace, and that, there­
fore, the Security Council could not make arbitrary de­
cisions on the Spanish question. But since the sub-com­
mittee had decided that the continuation of the situation 
mi (dit lead to a threat to international peace, the Council
2could make recommendations to correct the problem in Spain. 
These could include a severance of diplomatic relations
 ̂United Nations Security Council Official Records. 1st Year, 2nd Series, 719.
® Article 34 of the Charter gives the Security Coun­cil the authority to conduct such an investigation. Arti cle 39 gives the Security Council authority to apply the sanctions of Articles 41 and 42 and only if the Coun­cil has decided that a breach or threat to the peace ex­ists £t the moment o£ sanction.
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frith Spain by all the members of the United Nations*
Bvatt also explained the recommendation of the aub- 
committee that the Security Council refer the findings 
of the sub-committee to the General Assembly which 
would have jurisdiction over the Spanish question. Said 
Evatt:
We thought it proper that the Security Council should not be final arbiter in this matter, but as all the United Nations, and the natter of diplo­matic relations is involved, the matter should at last go to the General Assembly.^
Evatt * 8 statement raised protests from Lange of Po­
land who claimed that Bvatt had hinted that the Security 
Council did not have the jurisdiction to examine the Span­
ish question. Lange pointed out that he, himself, had 
never questioned the Security Council’s right to examine 
the Spanish question and that regardless of the findings 
of the sub-committee, he was of the opinion that the Se­
curity Council could take whatever action it deemed nec­
essary to correct the Spanish problem.
Parodi indirectly supported Lange, and Gromyko of 
the Soviet Union condemned the entire sub-committee re-
3 The General Assembly may discuss any question with­in the scope of the Charter and make recommendations to the Security Council or to the members of the United Na­tions on any matter or question, as long as the Security Council does not have the question on its agenda.
Council. 1st Year, 2nd Series, 761. of the Security
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port, claiming thet the work of the eub-committee had 
been a waste of time. Gromyko reviewed the history of 
Spaniah*German collaboration during the war and the ac­
tivities of the "Blue Division," the memory of which 
seemed to be a painful thorn in the side of the Soviets. 
Gromyko asserted that if the United Nations did not take 
the first step in the campaign to depose the Franco re­
gime , the first step being a break in diplomatic rela­
tions directed by the Oouneil, that the United Nations 
would be failing in its duty to preserve the peace. The 
Soviet delegate argued that the sub-committee had not 
dared to "draw the right conclusions although it was 
well aware of what they were," and he demanded that the 
Security Council (and not some lesser organ of the United 
Nations) decide what action to take on the Spanish ques­
tion. Otherwise the authority of the Security Council 
would be "undermined."
Herschel Johnson, the alternate delegate to the Coun­
cil from the United States, did not agree with Gromyko.
He wanted the Oouiicil to modify the recommendations of 
the sub-conmittee in such a way as to permit only the 
General Assembly to act upon the Spanish question. He 
announced that the United States would support the recom­
mendations of the sub-comnittee in the Security Council 
but was reserving its vote in the General Assembly. In
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other words, he would vote for the recommendation which 
referred the Spanish question to the General Assembly, 
but he was undecided as to how he would vote on the sec­
ond part of the sub-committee's recommendation that the 
United Nations break off diplomatic relations with Spain. 
This line was followed by Aflfi Pasha of Bygpt who an­
nounced that he would vote for the recommendation to re­
fer the Spanish question to the General Assembly, but he 
would not vote for any measure which called for a break 
in diplomatic relations with Spain.
Sir Alexander Cadogan wanted to amend the recommenda­
tion. He argued that although the regime in Spain was un­
doubtedly undemocratic and that Franco’s war record "was 
certainly black enough," he did not think that the Secur­
ity Council had any jurisdiction over the Spanish question 
and that the form of government of a country was "under 
the domestic jurisdiction of the country.Therefore, 
he warned the Council to be careful that its actions did 
not set a precedent out of line wi th its powers. Ha pro­
posed that the recommendation be amended so that it would 
merely endorse the March 4, 1946 declaration of the United 
States, Great Britain, and France and that it be sent to
® Ibid., 766.
43
Ôthe General Assembly without any other recommendation.
The proposed British amendment was attacked by Evatt 
of Australia who maintained that the aotion of the Secur­
ity Oouneil as proposed by the sub-committee report would 
not be intervention in Spanish affairs. He pleaded for 
the adoption of the sub-committee*s recommendat1ons. 
0-roD^ko of the Soviet Union end Lange of Poland also 
opposed the British resolution, maintaining that the 
original Polish resolution had not been drastic enough; 
if the sub-committee*s recommendations were amended now, 
it would be tantamount to taking no action at all. And 
if the amendment were accepted, the Polish delegation 
would vote against the recommendations.
When the British amendment was put to a vote, Gromyko 
of the Soviet Union and Lange of Poland voted against it,
and thus it failed to be adopted because a permanent mem-
7ber of the Security Council had voted against it. Then
the Polish resolution was put to a vote by the president,
    ■■ ■
® Ibid. . T98.
Decisions of the Security Council on important (or substantive) matters are made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members, provided that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. The preliminary question of whether a matter is procedural or substantive is itself substantive and therefore subject to the veto. There is no set definition of just what matters are substantive, but in practise they seem to be any matter in which a Great Power has an interest.
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and it alao failed to be adopted because of the Goviet 
Union’s opposition. (That part of th© resolution that 
contradicted the findings of the sub-committee and its 
recoicmendation on the jurisdiction of the Security Ooun­
eil had been eliminated.) Indeed, the resolution, intro­
duced by Lange of Poland, was so changed as a result of
the sub-committee*s recommendations that Lange, himself,
8also voted against It.
The situation became hopelessly muddled when the 
Polish delegate presented another resolution that the 
Oouneil vote on the original Polish resolution without 
considering the findings of the sub-committee. He argued 
that the Council had purposely pushed the Polish resolu­
tion aside and that it was correct procedure to vote on 
the original resolution. The president of the Security 
Council agreed with Lange and cdlled for a vote. The 
resolution was defeated, with only Frence, Mexico, the 
Soviet Union, and Poland voting for it.
The Polish and Soviet Union delegations, not dis­
heartened by this reversal, offered another resolution 
designed to keep the Spanish question on the agenda of 
the Security Council and out of the hands of the Ceneral
8 Lange voted against it not because the measure was not strong enough, but because he believed that the resolution should not go to the General Assembly.
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Assembly, a resolution which was the product of Coviet 
fears thet the Spanish question would be transferred to 
the Qreneral Assembly where the Soviet Union had no veto*
The resolution offered by the Polish end Soviet Union dele­
gations read as follows:
The Security Oouneil takea notice of the report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish question appointed on April 29, 1946. The Investigation of the Sub­committee confirms fully the facts which have led to the condemnation of the Spanish regime by the Con­ferences in San Francisco and Potsdam, by the General Assembly in London, and by the Security Council in the resolution of April 24, 1946*
The Security Council, therefore, decides to keep the situation under continuous observation and keep the question on the list of matters which it is seiz­ed in order to take such measures as may be necessary in the interest at peace end security*
The Security Council will take up the matter again not later than September 1, 1946, in order to deter­mine what appropriate practical measures provided by the Charter should be taken. Any member of the Coun­cil has a right to bring up the matter before the Security Council at any time before the mentioned date* ̂
Bvatt of Australia attacked the combined Polish-Soviet 
resolution on the grounds that it would defeat the very pur­
pose for which it was intended. Although the Polish dele­
gate argued that this new motion would produce some positive 
action, Evatt countered that it would merely bury the ques­
tion in the Security Council where the General Assembly
United Officiai Records _gf the Security Coun-cil, 1st Year, 2nd Series, 805•
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eould not &ot.
The combined Poll»h**Soviet Ualon reeolutloti wee not 
put to a vote* but Lan&e Immediately offered another reeo- 
lutiom. Thie reaelution# eelled the aeoond Folieh reao- 
lution, eee almoet like the combined Poliah-Sovlet Union 
resolution* Only the phraseology wee different» Svatt 
of Australie took issue with the phraseology of the third 
aentenee ehleh stated that the "Investigation also @e- 
tsbllahee beyond a doubt that Franco's faaclet regime Is 
a serious danger to the maintenance of international peace 
and security»" This ess not shat the Investigation had 
established; to the contrary. It had concluded that the 
regime was not an existing threat to the peace. Bvatt 
was of the opinion, along with Wang Shih Chleh of Ghina, 
that unless new facta were brought before the Qouncil, 
there were no grounds for further Council action. If ac­
tion were to be taken on the Spanish question, it would 
have to be in the General Assembly. r?vatt*s comment brought 
forth assertions from Lange that it was not the intention 
of hie motion to prevent action by the General Assembly 
on the matter. He appealed with the members of the Qouncil 
to "not again become prisoners of legal Interpretation»")^^
Ibid», 80b.
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The reBolutlon was also denounced by Alexander Cadogan 
who one© again expressed hi® view that the Spanish ques­
tion be referred to the General Assembly, Therefore, he 
proposed an amendment to strike out the clause requiring 
the matter to be brougtit up before the Security Council by 
September 1.
Soviet protests to the proposed British amendment were 
voiced at once, Gromyko argued that not only was the sec­
ond Polish resolution the very mildest measure that could 
be considered by the Council but that it and all th© other 
proposals, resolutions, counter-proposals, end amendments 
were inadequate. He said that as long as the Council seem­
ed to be incapable of taking any concrete steps to remove 
the menace of Franco Spain, the least it could possibly do 
would be to keep the question on the agenda. Gromyko warn­
ed that the acceptance of the British amendiaent would so
distort the original resolution that nothing would "remain
11but a blank space."
The split between the Soviet Bloc and the western 
Allies was growing wider. Even the French delegate, who 
up to now had supported the Soviet attacks on the Franco 
regime, recognized that the Polish proposal was not the re­
sult of Soviet determination to remove Franco from Spain 
but only an attempt to bolster the power and prestige of
Ibid., 819.
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the Security Council* He ^ave his full support to the 
British aczend&ent, as ciid Johnson, the United States al­
ternate delegate*
It was clear, then,that the second Polish resolution 
was doomen to failure# So the untiring Lange proposed the 
appointaient of a drafting committee to construct a reso­
lution favorable to a majority of the Council members.
The main question, of course, was whether the British a- 
mendment would be included by the drafting committee. All 
the Council members approved the selection of a committee, 
and Parodl appointed the delegates of Australia, foland, 
and the United Kingdom to draw up a uraift resolution on 
the Spanish question* This was a rather fitting selection, 
since Svatt of Australia was chairman of the Special In­
vestigating Committee, Lange of Poland the author of the 
resolution, and Cadogan of the United Kingdom the author 
of the amendment*
It did not ta^e this committee long to reach an agree­
ment, and before the next meeting of the Council Svatt an­
nounced that the drafting committee had been able to agree 
upon a draft resolution which read:
Whereas the Security Council on April 29, 194S appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the situation in Spain# ,
and whereas Idrie investigation of the sub-com­mittee has fully confirmed the facts which led to the condemnation of the Franco regime by the Potsdam and San Francisco conferences.
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the General Assembly at the first part of Its first session and by the Security Council by resolution of the date above mentioned,
and whereas the sub-cmmilttee was of the opin­ion that the situation in Spain is one the con­tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
it is hereby resolved that without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly under the Charter, the Security Council deems the situa­tion in Spain under continuous observation and maintains it upon the list of matters which it is seized in order that it will be at all times ready to take such measures as may become nec­essary to maintain international peace and se­curity; any member of the Security Council may bring the matter up for consideration by the Council at any time.
The only difference between this new resolution and 
Lange*s motion was the deletion of the date clause re­
quiring the Council to bring up the matter by September 1, 
The resolution seemed to allow the General Assembly to ex 
amine the situation, too, but in reality it did not! The 
resolution stated that "without prejudice to the rights 
of the General Assembly under the Charter" the Security 
Council would keep the question under continuous observa­
tion. This meant that the General Assembly would merely 
keep the powers given it by the Charter; the Security 
Council did not give it a new right (nor could it under 
the Charter). Therefore, the General Assembly could not 
make any recommendations on the Spanish question as long
Ibid., 822.
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es the Security Council kept the matter under observa* 
tion.
There were two interpretations of the resolution draft 
ed by the committee, one by Poland and one by Australia, 
so divergent that It was decided that In reality there 
were two resolutions, and therefore, that the Council 
would have to vote on each of them. The Polish delegate 
Interpreted the resolution to mean that the Security Coun­
cil would take further action on the Spanish question be­
fore the situation worsened, while the Australian dele­
gate believed that the resolution meant that the Council 
would not take further action on the Spanish question un­
less It actually threatened International peace. The In­
terpretation of the Australian delegate was viewed by 
Orcnayko as resulting "in a resolution both empty and ridi­
culous."^^ Both Interpretations of the proposal were de­
feated, with the Australian, British, end the American 
delegates voting against the Polish Interpretation, and 
the Soviet Union and the Polish delegates voting against 
the Australian interpretation.
One Important implication of these votes on the two 
interpretations of the resolution was that they marked
Article 12 of the United Nations Charter. 
Ibid., 828.
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the turning point In the Mexican attitude toward Soviet 
policy In the Oouneil* For the first time in the history 
of the Spanish question* the Mexican dele$;ate sharply 
criticized Soviet intentions and asserted that the Soviet 
Union was more interested in protecting the power of the 
Security Council then in removing Franco from Spain#
The debate now became almost completely buried in 
legal interpretation* with amendments* amendments to a- 
mendments* and procedural arguments* until it was finally 
decided to put the resolution of the drafting committee to 
a vote sentence by sentence# This vote was to prove the 
end of an affair described by Evatt as a "scandal." Fran­
cisco Najera* who had replaced Parodi as president* announc­
ed that the proposal had been defeated because the Soviet 
Union had voted against the sentences which gave the reso­
lution its meaning. The Security Oouncil now laid the Span­
ish question aside#
Before the Oaneral Assembly can take action upon any 
question being discussed in the Council* the Security Coun­
cil must "remove the matter from the list of matters which 
it has s e i z e d # W i t h  respect to the Spanish question* ac
tion was taken at the 79th meeting of the Security Council
16on November 4, 1946# Strange as it may seem* the propos-
Ibid.. 493. 
Ibid.. 499.
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al to remove the Spanish question from the Security Coun­
cil agenda was made by Lange of Poland, the seme man oho 
earlier had worked so herd to defeat a similar proposai 
In the Council. Just three months before, the Soviet and 
Polish delegates had sacrificed their desire to take ac­
tion against Spain to defeat a resolution allowing the 
General Assembly to examine the Spanish question. At 
that time, both Lange and Gromyko had vigorously opposed 
any attempt to place the matter in the hands of the Gener­
al Assembly. How, on November 4, Poland changed Its policy, 
and It was Lange of Poland who requested the Council to re­
move the Spanish question from the agenda of the Security 
Council. The resolution prepared by Lange read:
The Security Council resolves that the sit­uation in Spain be taken off the list of matters of which the Council Is seized, and that all records and documents of the ease be at the disposal of the General Assem-
This proposal was almost like the proposal which the 
Soviet Union and Poland had defeated In resolution af­
ter resolution just a few months before.
It is not hard to establish a motive for this change 
in Soviet diplomacy. A month before, on October 15, 1946, 
the Council had unanimously resolved to make the Inter­
national Court of Justice available to states not parties
|bid., 493.
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to the Statute of the Court. Aft^r the International 
Court resolution had been passed by the Council, Lange 
once again had pressed his campaign against Franco Spain 
by arguing that it would not be possible for Spain to 
claim the advantages of the International Court because 
of the character of its regime. He had proposed a reso­
lution specifically to exclude Spain from the Statute of 
the Court:
In accordance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in London on the 9th of February and the 10th of February, 1946, the above resolution does not apply to those states whose regimes have been installed Whth the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these re­gimes are in power.!®
Prom the debate which followed the presentetion of 
this resolution, it was evident that it was doomed to 
failure, for the delegates of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Brazil stated that 
they would vote against the proposal, because it was 
contrary to the "fundamental concepts of justice," When 
the resolution was put to a vote, it was rejected, with 
only France, Mexico, Poland, and the Soviet Union voting 
for it.
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The Soviet Union and Poland beoame oonvliieed froti 
this defeat that they would never attain their goal, 
that la, the adoption of diplomatic sanctions against 
Spain* so long as the matter remained In the Security 
Council* Hoping ttmt they would have a better chance In 
the General Assembly, Lange proposed the dropping of the 
Spanish question from the Council agenda. The latest 
Polish resolution was put to a vote on the same day and 
was unanimously adopted* As a result, the General As­
sembly was free to act upon the Spanish question.
All In all, the action on the Spanish question in 
the Security Council was a dismal failure* The Soviet 
Union and the Anglo-American faction failed to reach an 
agreement, with both sides more Interested In further­
ing their national interests than reaching a compromise*
The Soviet Union believed that the different resolutions 
proposed in the Council were not drastic enough and re­
fused to compromise. The United States, the United King­
dom, and their friends on the Council (Brazil, Bygpt, 
Australia, The Netherlands, China) believed that it was 
more important to refrain from interfering in the inter­
nal affairs of a country than to depose the Franco regime* 
The Soviet Union and Poland, too, allowed other consider­
ations to influence their action in the Council* At first, 
they were afraid to let the problem slip out of the hands
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of the SeoLiTlty Govmell for fear that it would stranath- 
en the General Aeeembly to Soviet disadvantage. (In the 
Security Council the Soviet Union could better watch over 
Its own interests through the use of the **veto” than in 
the General Assembly where decisions on important matters 
require only a two-thirds vote of the members present and 
voting.) Mexico and France, influenced by pressures at 
home, supported first one side and then the other, but 
in the end they gave their support to the Anglo-American 
bloc. As the situation between the western Allies and 
the Soviet bloc worsened and the picture of a Spain al­
lied to the United States and the United Kingdom was en­
visioned by the Kremlin, the Soviets agreed to place the 
Spanish question on the agenda of the General Assembly.
The big question now was whether the Soviet Union would 
be able to persuade the Assembly to adopt sanctions against 
Spain after the Security Council had refused.
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Chapter IV. A Change of Scene
The scene of action now changed from the Security Coun­
cil to the Oeneral Aasembly# Since the Council had felled 
to adopt any measurea directed against the Franco regime 
In Spain, much to the disappointment of the Polish and 
Soviet Union delegations. It was now to the General Assembly 
that these delegations looked for success. The Spanish 
question was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly 
at the joint request of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Norway, and Venezuela and was Immediately referred to the 
First Coraalttee on Political and Security Questions* Dr. 
Dlmltrl Z. Manullsky of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re­
public was chairman of the committee when the Spanish ques­
tion was introduced at the thirty-fifth meeting on December 
8, 1946.
Lange, the former Polish delegate to the Security Coun­
cil (Poland was not a permanent member of the Security Coun­
cil and so used Lange as its representative In the General 
Assembly when the Oouncil was not In session) and the most 
determined of Franco's enemies In the United Nations, In­
troduced the Spanish question to the committee. He elo­
quently stressed the Importance of taking action against 
Franco Spain and again reviewed Franco's war record and 
the Axis Intervention which brought him to power. He also 
reminded the committee of the findings of the Security
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Council*» special sub-committee on the Spanish question, 
and, possibly trying to make the report seem more Import­
ant than It really was, incorrectly Interpreted It. He 
claimed that the sub-committee had found that the situa­
tion created "isy the existence and activities of the Fran­
co regime In Spain was a threat to the peace of the world, 
when the truth of the matter was that the sub-committee 
had found that the situation In Spain was not a threat 
to the peace. Lange asked the members of the committee 
to draft a resolution which would actively aid the Span­
ish people to throw off %he ®yoke of slavery".^
Taken as a #io]e , the coimlttee approved the request 
of Lange. Zuloaga of Venezuela defended the right of the 
United Nations to deal with the Spanish question, end he 
dismissed the claims of some members that United Nations 
action against the Franco regime would be a violation of 
the non-intervention clause of the Charter. The Security 
Council, he said, had already concluded that United Na­
tions action would not Constitute Intervention (probably 
referring to the sub-committee report). Therefore, the 
matter wad settled, as the General Assembly could not 
question the decisions of the Security Council. Zuloaga
 ̂ "Records of the First Committee", United Nations
General ZâEJLs. SSJâSSâSession. PA^ob&l:-^.se,pber, 104g» 36^
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also requested the members of the committee to draft e
resolution which would aid the Spanish people In their
fight for freedom.
When Zuloaga finished, Connally of the United States
presented a draft resolution for the committee*s study.
This resolution assured the Spanish people of the warm
friendship of the United Nations and condemned the Franco
regime. It declared that:
The General Assembly recommends:
that the Franco Government be debarred from membership In international agencies set up at the Initiative of the United Nations, and from participation In conferences or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government Is formed In Spain.^
Conspicuously absent from the United States resolu­
tion was any mention of a break in diplomatic relations.
In feet the exclusion of Franco Spain from the special­
ised agencies as recommended In the United States reso­
lution meant very little since membership In these agencies 
Is not a requirement for the conduct of International re­
lations. (The Soviet Union In 19^1 belongs to none of 
these agencies, has never belonged to more than four of 
them). The United States, by presenting Its moderate re­
solution, hoped to prevent any drastic action against the 
Franco regime. The resolution was not presented for vote
^ I b i d . , 3 5 6 .
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but merely for study by the committee.
After the presentation of Connally*s proposal* two 
very strong pro-Franco speeches were made by Rector David 
Castro of El Salvador end Ricardo Fournier of Costa Rica.^ 
These two speakers denied that the United Nations had 
jurisdiction in the Spanish question* claiming that any 
United Nations action would be a violation of the non­
intervention principle. Fournier announced that his gov­
ernment would not hesitate to recognize any regime so 
long 8S it was stable and did not interfere with other 
countries.
Saenz of Guatemala and Mora of Uruguay held a differ­
ent view. They argued that any attempt to maintain cor­
dial relations with Franco would amount to intervention 
in his favor. The Nicaraguan delegate in turn rejected 
this approach to the question, and* along with the Colom­
bian delegate* supported the United States resolution.^ 
Lange countered the United States resolution by pro­
posing that the committee adopt a resolution similar to 
the United States resolution but also calling for a break 
in diplomatic relations with Franco Spain.
From the debate between the friends and foes of the 
United States resolution* it was evident that the résolu-
® Ibid.. 368.
* 1614.. 359.
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tlon wouXd not be aooeptable to a large majority In the 
General Aasembly. There were also many oomplalnta against 
the Polish counter*proposal which called for a break in 
diplomatic relations with Spain. The strongest argument 
against the Polish resolution was that if the General 
Assembly celled for a break in diplomatic relations with 
Spain* and the members of the United Nations failed to 
comply, It would be a fatal blow to the United Nations.
(The General Assembly can never do more than recommend 
action to the member states.)
It appeared that the Political Committee would be
unable to agree on a resolution dealing with the Spanish
question* totct Thor Thora of Iceland suggested a compromise.
Thors requested thet the Political Committee select a
sub-committee to examine the various proposals* resolutions,
and amendments and to draft a resolution acceptable to the
majority of the General Assembly. The committee unanimously
approved the Iceland proposal * and it elected representatives
of the permanent members of the Security Council and the
authors of all resolutions* proposals, and amendments on
the Spanish question to serve on the sub-committee. The
sub-committee was charged with the task of "seeking common
ground among the many resolutions and producing an original
&resolution which might be unanimously acceptable."
^ Ibld^. 270.
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Oomposed of Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Soc­
ialist Republic,'Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, France, 
Guatemala, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, this special 
sub-committee delivered Its report on December 9, 1946 to 
the forty-third meeting of the Political Committee. (ThisV'
sub-committee was not appointed to investigate the Spanish
question and to make corrective recommendationsf but merely
to reach a political compromise between the Great Powers.)
After a short discussion of the draft resolution^prepared
by the committee, short because the battle had already
been won in the sub-committee hearings,^ the resolution
was put to a vote, paragraph by paragraph, and finally 
6adopted. ; «
At long last a resolution was to reach the General/Assembly which promised the Franco regime some real trou­
ble and which was acceptable to the majority of the mem­
bers of the United Nations. The resolution, one of the 
most important in the history of International organization, 
(this was the first time that the character of government 
of a country was deemed incompatible with the principles 
of "right and justice" as determined by the rest of the
6  ̂Ibid.-. 293.
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world) declared that %
The peoples of the United Nations at San Francisco, Potsdam and London condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decided that as long as the regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations.
The General Assembly in its resolution of Feb­ruary 9, 1946, recommended that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and spirit of the declarations of San Francisco and Potsdam.
The peoples of the United Nations assure the Span­ish people of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial welcome awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the United Nations.
The General Assembly recalls that in May and June 1946, the Security Council conducted an investigation of the possible further action to be taken by the United Nations* The sub-committee of the Security Council charged with the investigation found unanimously:
(a) In origin, nature, structure, and general conduct the Franco regime is a fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from Hitler's Nazi Germany and MussoliniFascist Italy*
(b) During the long struggle of the United Nations against Hitler and Mussolini,Franco, despite continued Allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy powers. First, for example, from 1941to 1946 the Blue Infantry Division, the Spanish Legion of Volunteers and the Salvador Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia on the Eastern front*Second, in the summer of 1940, Spain seized Tangier in breach of inter­national statute, and as a result of Spain maintaining a large army in Spanish Morocco, large numbers of Allied troops were immobilized in North Africa.
(e) Incontrovertible documentary evidence establishes that Franco was a guilty
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party with Hitler and Mussolini in the oonsplraey to wage war against those eountries which eventually in the course of the war became banded together as the United Nations. It was a part of the conspiracy that Franco’s belligerency should be postponed until a time to be mutually agreed upon.
The General Asaembly, convinced that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain, which was Imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis powers during the war, does not represent the Spanish people and by Its continued control of Spain Is making Impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations In international affairs;
recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by, or brought Into relationship with the United Nations, and from.participation in conferences or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain.
The General Assembly further desiring to secure the participation of all peace-loving peoples. Including the people of Spain, in the community of nations: IRecommends that If within a reasonable time there Is not established a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed, com­mitted to respect freedom of speech, religion and assembly, and to the prompt holding of an election In which the Spanish people, free from force and intermediation and regardless of party, may ex­press their will, the Security Oouncil consider the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation and:
Recommends that all members of the United Nations iBuaediately recall from Madrid their Ambassadors and Ministers plenipotentiary accredited there.
304
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This resolution anast be eonsldered a mild diplomatic 
victory for the Soviet bloc# as It was almost Identical 
(at least In the action It called for) to the Polish pro­
posals made In the Political Committee* 'However# there 
was one slight difference; a difference which appears to 
be slight# but In reality was very Important* The Polish 
proposals had called for a break In diplomatic relations# 
while the proposed resolution only recommended that the 
members of the United Rations recall their ministers and 
ambassadors* This did not mean a break In diplomatic re­
lations# and Franco would have all the advantages of dip­
lomatic recourse offered by the legations# but he would 
have to deal through a minor official# probably an attaché 
or a chargé d*affairs. The resolution also accepted the 
findings of the sub-committee appointed by the Security 
Coiuicll without reservation*
The Political Committee presented the resolution to 
the General Assembly on December IS# 1946* At once the 
debate began all over again# but the enemies of Franco 
were convinced that the resolution would be adopted*
Nieto del Rio of Chile argued that the resolution was 
not all that could be hoped for# but at least It was a 
step In the right direction* Moreover# the Spanish people 
would surely welcome this documen^ as evidence that the 
majority of the members of the United Nations ”support
m
Bthem in their fervent deeire for freedom. ** He aleo 
eeverely eritielted those membere of the United Hatlons 
eho had atteeked the résolution as a violation of the 
prlneiple of non-intervention and challenged them to pro­
duce a valid argument proving that the resolution vould 
be ft violation of the non-Intervention clause of the Ohar- 
ter. Perhaps del Hlo considered the Security Oounoil's 
"Special Sub-Oommittee on the Spanish Question" (which had 
declared the situation caused by the ^ranco regisie in Spain 
to be one "essentially not within the domestic control" of 
Spain) to toe the highest legal authority on the subject.
The resolution was also defended by Leon Jouhoux of France 
who pointed out that It was not an act by the United Hâ­
tions, but merely an act of sovereignty by the individual 
nations at the recommendation, not the oosmand, of the 
United Nations.
These views were not shared by Alfonso Lopes of Golom­
ble, who said that the United Nations could hardly impose 
sanctions on ©pain with the backing of such ft small ma­
jority (the majority which passed the resolution in the 
ccHsmittee where only a simple majority of the members vot­
ing was needed might not be enough to pass the resolution
àsujkmHx. g‘g.,ri„tlgg Easspâa»
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in the General Aseembly where a two-thirds majority of 
the members present end voting was needed). He express­
ed his fear that the United Nations "was fast violating" 
the prinsiples of the Charter and thought that the time 
had come to "fix limits* provide for exeeptions so that 
we may organize the world aeeording to the prineipies of 
the Charter."® He wondered if "this intervention*! would 
not lead eventually to a demand that member nations al­
ter their dixaestla laws to suit the majority of the As­
sembly. (He eonsidered that this resolution meant that 
the United Nations was trying to foree a dhanga in the 
domestie law of Spain at the request of ^ e  majority in 
the General Assembly.)
Lopez came closer to expressing the most logical 
argument against any action by the United Nations on the 
Spanish question than any speaker since the question had 
been introduced idien he said:
Today we are dealing with Spain. But Spain is not the only country in which all the fundamental free­doms are not respected; nor is it the only one to which an invitation might be extended to change its government and revise institutions and political practices in the manner desired by a majority of ,the United Nations. We are in the act of impos­ing on a state which does not yet belong to our organization, standards of political life which are not yet fully applied in several of the mem­ber countries. 10
9 IbHt. . 1172. 
Ibid. . 1172.
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Ho concluded by remarking that he was not defending the 
policy of non-intervention, but he wanted to know just
< Iwhat path the United Nations Intended to follow. If It
were to be a policy of Intervention, the Oharter should
' ' 'be changed to permit this policy. -
The attack upon the resolution was then taken up
t 'by Castro of El Salvador. He accused President Spaak
I f  i L* .
Of the General Assembly of restricting the debate In
■ (such a manner that It tended to favor the supporters of 
the resolution. This accusation was denied by Spaak, 
and the members of the Assembly expressed their confl- 
dence In his fairness and Impartiality. The arguments 
against the resolution were reviewed by Castro, who di­
vided them Into five classifications. First, the conse­
quences of the isolation to which Spain would be condemn­
ed would not affect the government of Spain, but they 
would cause the Spanish people to suffer needlessly# Sec­
ond, the only possible effect on the government of Spain 
would be to bring the Spanish people to such a state of 
despair that they would try to depose the ^ranco regime 
by the means of a bloody civil war. Third, while the 
resolution was being discussed and when there was abso­
lutely no foreign Interference In the affairs of Spain, 
now was the time to permit the Spanish people to decide 
for themselves without outside help what kind of govern-
6 8
ment they wanted. Fourth, the Imposition of diplomatia 
sanetione against Spain would be intorventlon in a mat­
ter which according to the Oharter of the United Nations 
belonged within the Internal jurisdiction of Spain* Fifth, 
if the resolution were passed by the Oenercl Assembly, it 
would constitute an invasion of the powers of the Secur­
ity Council, which alone had the right to cell for coer­
cive meaaures. These arguments were presented by vari­
ous other nations, but the most vigorous attack against 
tiw resolution was the denunciation by Castro.
The speeches by del Rio of Chile, Lopez of Colombia, 
and Castro of HI Salvador contained the most important 
of the arguments for and against the resolution which 
recommended that the members of the United Nations recall 
their aiabaesadors from Madrid.
There were two important legal questions raised by 
the debate. What were the rights and duties of member 
states of the United Nations? And was it the duty of a 
member state to follow the recommendation of the General 
Assembly? The subsequent action by the members seemed to 
show that the states did not have to follow the recommenda­
tions of the United Nations*
President Spaak managed to limit the debate on the res­
olution and finally put it to vote. The roll call vote 
showed that the measure had been adopted with thirty-four
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1b favor of* the reeolution, and six against, with thlr-
IIteen abatentlona. 
lution were:
Those nations voting for the reso-
Âustralla LuxembourgBelgium MexicoBolivia Hew ZealandBrazil NicaraguaByelorussian Soviet Socialist NorwayRepublic Chile ChinaCzechoslovakiaDenmarkEthiopiaFranceGuatemala 'HaitiIcelandIndiaIranLiberia
PanamaPhilippine RepublicPolandParaguaySwedenUkrainian Soviet Social­ist Republic United Kingdom ,Uruguay United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republice Venezuela Yugoslavia
Those nations voting against the resolution were;
Argentina Costa Rica Dominican Republic
Those nations abstaining were:
AfghanistanCanadaColombiaCubaSygptGreece
Ecuador El Salvador Peru
HondurasThe NetherlandsSaudi ArabiaSyriaTurkeyUnion of South Africa
The adoption of the resolution showed that a majority 
of the members of the United Nations favored action on the 
Spanish question* The action promised by the resolution.
11 1206.
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ho#ever, would not (it eeemod probable) effect the Franco 
regime any more than the previous condemnations (Potsdam,
San Francisco, and the Three Power Joint Declaration.)
The resolution was more important in revealing that 
the members of the United Nations oould still reach an 
agreement on an important question. The adoption of the 
resolution was a victory for the enemies of Franco in the 
United Nations. It did not promise to remove Franco from 
Spain, but at least it was a step in that direction, and 
it left the responsibility for the Spanish question to the 
Security Council. Lange of Poland must be given the ^cred­
it" for the resolution. He introduced it before the Secur­
ity Council, was a member of every drafting committee, of 
the First Committee on Political Questions, Introduced the 
resolution to the Ceneral Assembly, and gave his support 
to the resolution at every opportunity, both within the 
United Nations and behind the scenes.
Resolution ”39(1)** as it was officially known, which 
recommended that the members of the United Nations recall 
their diplomatic representatives from Kadrid, was the high 
point in the United Nations campaign against Franco Spain.
The western Allies and their followers in the United Nations, 
despite their doubts of the efficacy of the resolution, voted 
for it in an effort to achieve unanimity in the Ceneral As­
sembly. Resolution 39(1) was the last proposal on the
71
Spanish question ehieh found the wastsrn Allies and the 
Soviet Union voting together*
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Chapter V. The Failure of The General AssemblyResolution
Supporters of the United Nations awaited the out­
come of the Assembly's recommendation for an immediate 
recall of ambassadors and ministers accredited to Mad­
rid. The bis question was whether the nations whose dele­
gates in the United Nations had fought and voted against 
the resolution would comply with its provisions. It was 
a test of the effectiveness of the new world organization, 
for if the members of the United Nations refused to follow 
the recommendations of the General Assembly, then the 
prestige of the United Nations would suffer, and it would 
seem to be following in the footsteps of the League. The 
effectiveness of the resolution was not officially known 
until the publication of the "Report of the Secretary- 
General on the Work of the Organization" in July, 1947.
Immediately after the resolution had been passed by 
the General Assembly, the Secretary-General had sent a 
circular telegram on December 20, 1946 to all member na­
tions requesting that they inform him of the action they 
were taking in accordance with ^ e  resolution.^ By July, 
1947, he had received fifty-five replies. These were 
divided into six classifications:
(1) Three states <B1 Salvador, the United Kingdom, 
and The Netherlands) had recalled their diplomatic repre-
QCIiJll&I E&&PEÉ#, a L United Nations. Annual E&-
vistn% a t  taa. aR work sit ar&mX"zstlon. 1S41, 3.
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sentatives in Madrid Immediately following adoption of 
the résolution by the Assembly.
(2) nineteen states (Brazil« Belgium, Chile, Colom­
bia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Bygpt, France, 
Greece, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Tur­
key, the United States, and Uruguay) had no ambassadors 
or ministers accredited to Madrid at the time of l^e a- 
doptlon of the resolution: their legations had been In
charge of minor officials.
(3) The largest classification was that group of
states (Af^anistan, Australia, Bolivia, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand,
Panama, Poland, the Fhlllplne Republic, Saudi Arabia,
Siam, Syria, Union of South Africa, Ukranian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia) which had had no diplcxnatie
relations of any kind at the time of the adoption of the 
2resolution.
(4) Liberia assured the United Nations that it would 
adhere to iûne resolution, but at present its minister 
was still in Madrid.
(ô) The Dominican Republic informed the United
^ I b i d . , 3 .
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Mations that it had not daeided what to do about the 
résolution but assured the 8eoratary-General that ha 
"would be the first to know."
(d) The one state whieh did not comply with the 
reooamendation of the General Assembly was Argentina.
The Argentine govarnmant had simply aeknowladged receipt 
of the communication, but it was later revealed that it 
had not only refused to recall its ambassador from Madrid, 
but had even sent a new ambassador, an action distinctly 
contrary to the United Rations recommendation.
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly also 
had excluded Franco Spain from membership in the special­
ized agencies of the United Nations, and these agencies 
ware complying with the resolution completely. In July, 
1947, at the time of the Secretary-General * s report, the 
Bconmaic and Social Council had excluded Franco Spain 
from participation in any of the coxmmisalons of the Goun- 
eil. For instance, the Social Commission had refused 
to consult with any agency maintaining relations with 
Spain, and the Economic and Social Council approved this 
decision at its fourth meeting.^
In line with the General Assembly resolution, the 
Bconomic and Social Council resolved that "international
® Ibid.. a.
'* yfM-UgffiH St. Saa. Onlt.d Matlon». 1947. 344.
Rom-#»v#rRmentorg&nlzetlon», the policies of whieh 
era eoatrolled fey the Franco Ooverrimant^ cannot fee eon- 
siAcred for eoasiiltetive statua***^ The Ooimcil eonclnd* 
ad that international non-goremmantal organizations 
shoald fee allglfel# for **eonsultatlTS status*’ If:
(1) They had only individual représentatives in 
Spain whl^ were not organized Into a legally constituted 
"Spanish feranch;"
(S) There were such legally constituted branches in 
Spain# and if they had a purely humanitarian character 
end their policies were not controlled and determined fey 
the Franco Government.^
The question of Franco Spain also arose in connection 
with the transfer to th@ United Nations of the powers ex­
ercised hy the League of Nations under the agreements on 
narcotics. The Bconomic and Social Council invited all 
non-BC3â>era except Franco Spain to become parties to the 
new protocol.
Thus# the results of the resolution were better than 
had been expected# with only Argentina refusing to com­
ply with the recommendation of the General Assemfely to 
recall its diplomatic representative from Madrid. Pro- 
Franco 21 Salvador# en the other imnd# recalled its min»
® Ibid.. 345. 
6 Ibid.# S47.
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leter from Madrid after having fought against adop­
tion of the resolution* Even though the members of the 
United Kations who had not been in favor of the resolu­
tion still held the same views that they had expressed 
in the General Assembly, they complied with the terms 
of the resolution because they wi shed to support the 
United Kations and not because they approved of the reso­
lution* (The resolution had recommended that those mem­
bers who had diplomatic representatives In Madrid recall 
them. It requested nothing from those members Who had 
no ministers in Spain* In a sense, however, these mem­
bers were aoaqilying with the resolution* Certainly, 
they took no action to establish relations with the 
Franco Government.)
Three months later, in November, 19^7, the Spanish 
question was again brought up In the General Assembly.
The last paragraph of the General Assembly resolution 
adopted on Deeember 12, 1946, had stated that If within 
a "reasonable time" a new government in Spain had not 
been established acceptable to the United Nations, the 
Security Council would "consider the adequate measures 
to be taken to remedy the situation. Almost a year 
had passed, and still Franco was supreme in Spain* The 
Security Council had failed to take "adequate measures"
7 See Chapter IV, page 64*
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to remedy the eituatlon in Spain, end ao the question 
was brought up in the General Aseembly by Lange of Po­
land*
The Spanish question was referred to the First Oom- 
spittee on Politieal Questions ehich discussed the matter 
at its 103rd meeting on November 10, 1947. The first 
speaker «as Arturo Despradel of the Dominican Republic 
«ho reminded the committee that his government had al­
ways opposed the resolution because it constituted in­
tervention in Spanish affairs.
Lange of Poland protested that Despradel W d  mis­
interpreted the facts. He requested that the United 
Nations follow up the resolution calling for a recall 
of ministers from Spain by adopting economic sanctions 
against the Franco regime and submitted a draft resolu­
tion which read:
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming again its resolution 39 (I) of December IS, 1946, concerning relations of Member states of the United Nations with Spain,
FeccsmiendB to the Security Council that it con­sider within a month the Spanish question and that it take adequate measures in conformity with Article 41 of the Charter, in order to remedy the present situation according to the resolution of Deeember 12, 1946.8
® United Nations Official Records of the General Assem­bly. Records of the First Committee, 1st Part, Second Session, November, 1947, Annex 20-A, No. A/O1/269, 620.
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The Polish delegate, hoped that the adoption of the res- 
olutlon would lead to the applloation of économie sanctionsV {
against Franco Spain* Lange was supported in this view by 
Stolk of Venezuela and Maaaryk of Gzeehoslovakia who also 
called for stronger measures to be taken by the General 
Assembly. They declared that they would vote for any 
measure which would lead to the establishment of ^tpue 
liberty" in Spain.^
The opposition to Lange's resolution was led by the 
delegations of The Netherlands* Belgium, and Oanada* Van 
Roijen of The Netherlands said that it would be useless 
to adopt resolutions which appeared on the surface to con­
demn the Franco regime in Spain but which in reality were 
of "doubtful constitutionality and which might strengthen 
the Franco r e g i m e * H e  said that the resolution of De­
eember IS, 1946, had actually strengthened Franco by rally­
ing to him certain groups of Spaniards who objected to 
what they considered as foreign interference in the affairs 
of their country.
Van Roijen was supported by Sir Zafrullah Khan of Pak­
istan who questioned the jurisdiction that the United Na­
tions had already assumed in its dealings with Franco1' (
Spain. He thought that the imposition of sanctions as
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called for in Article 41 of the Charter might oomeday 
commit the United Kations to aggressive action by the 
majority vote of the General Assembly. This was another 
way of saying that the resolution of December 12, 1946, 
amounted to direct intervention in the internal affairs 
of s country in violation of the Charter.
This snjce line of reasoning was followed by the dele­
gate from Peru who claimed that **the actions of a state, 
not the dialeticf^ of e third party,” could provide the 
only grounds for justified action by the United Nations. 
VyorjR Lakshmi Fondit of India declared that a wider issue 
than the welfare of the Spanish people and the election of 
a government sntl&factrry to tbo United Kctiens was Involv­
ed. She pointed out tliat the resolution of Doceaber 18, 
1946, had been ineffective as far ee changing the regime
in Spelr was concerned and tliut it had imperiled the pres-
12tlge of tha I ted Nations.
It was clear from the dlscusalona that many of tJio 
members of the cormaittee considered that the imposition 
of econoiBle sanctions was too severe. However, some of 
the Ren bare believed that some action should be taken on 
the Spanish question, so a joint resolution was pre­
sented by Belgium, The Netharlands, and Luxembourg. The
11 Ibid.. 407. 
Ibid., 408.
80
résolution« k,nomn &s th© B-îucIux resolution, deelared 
that:
The Genex’al
Takes acte of the L’eoretary-üeneral ̂ s annual Report dealing with the relatione of members of the United Uatlons with Spain, and notea the measures taken by virtue of resolution 39 (I) regarding such relations adopted by tho tîenerc.1 Asaoiably on December 13, 1946;
kegrets ünac the rsco2ananda\:ion inviting all Members of the United Nations to recall their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary from Hadrid immediately has not been fully applied;
Sxpresses Its confidence that the Security Council will exercise Its rssponsibllities for the mainten­ance of international peace end security as soon as the Spanish question shell require the adoption of such measures.
This resolution did not recommend any action on the Spanish 
question. It merely expressed the "hope" of the General 
Assembly that the Security Council would do its duty if 
the occasion should ever arise. It did not recommend 
that the Security Council take action on the Spanish 
question even in the future, unless the Security Council 
deemed it necessary.
The Benelux draft resolution was followed by a resolution 
drawn up by the delegations of Mexico, Cube, Guetamala, Pan­
ama, and Uruguay. It was introduced by the Mexican delegate 
who wanted the General Assembly to refrain from passing any
13 Ibid.. Annex 20-0, No. A/C1/861, 626.
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measure stronger than the resolution of December 12, 1946. 
The resolution merely affirmed this declaration, and read: 
The General Assembly,
Reaffirms Its resolution 39(1) adopted on December 12, 1946, concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain, and
Expresses Its confidence that the Security Council will exercise Its responsibilities under the Char­ter should It consider that the situation In Spain so requires.*’
The United States delegate, supporting the Latin-Amer­
ican and Benelux resolutions, affirmed that the United 
States would oppose any proposal which might cause vio­
lence, or impose undue hardship on the Spanish people, 
or which might give rise **to endless repercussions.
The United States was supported by the Indian delegate, 
who also warned against any strong measures.
Just the opposite view was held by the members of the 
Soviet bloc. Gromyko of the Soviet Union made the strong­
est speech yet heard on the Spanish question. He re­
capitulated the whole history of the Spanish affair, 
stressing the part played by the United States and the 
United Kingdom. He directly accused the United States 
and the United Kingdom of protecting Franco In the United
14 Ibid., Annex 20-B, No. A/C1/260, 626 
iSiât. 418.
Mations. Ho said, in part:
The volume of trade between those countries and Spain had increased considerably. Spain had been granted large credits, especially by Argen­tina. British and American capital controlled a number of industries In Spain; no attempt was made to hide their economic relations: on thecontrary the countries in question sought Just­ification in the fact that it would be difficult for them to do without their business relations in Spain.
It was evident from the debate that neither the 
Benelux nor the Latin-Amerioan resolution would receive 
the necessary two-thirds vote. A dangerous split in the 
committee was averted when Cuba and France proposed the 
selection of a sub-committee to find a resolution ac­
ceptable to a majority. The committee approved this 
proposal by twenty-three votes to seventeen, with eleven 
abstentions, and the chairman appointed the delegates of 
Belgium, Cuba, Mexico, Cuatemala, India, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Panama, Poland, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia to
jffserve on the sub-committee.
The sub-committee, or drafting committee, did not take 
long to reach an agreement on a draft resolution. This 
resolution was presented on behalf of the sub-committee by 
the delegate from Cuba on November IB, 1947, and read as
ISOâi.. 412
Ibid. . 413
follows:
Whereas the Secretary-General in his annual report has informed the General Assembly of the steps taken by the Member states of the Organization in pursuance of its recommendation of December IS, 1946;
The General Assembly,
Reaffirms its resolution 39(1) adopted on December IS, 1946 concerning relations of Members of the United Nations, with Spain and,
Expresses its confidence that the Security Council will exercise its responsibilities under the Charter as soon as it considers that the situation so implies*
After the resolution had been read to the committee, the
Argentine delegate expressed his thanks **on behalf of the
Spanish people" that the Polish resolution calling for the
1 9adoption of economic sanctions had been withdrawn* Be­
fore the resolution was put to a vote, the delegates made 
their customary speeches explaining how they would vote 
and without exception held the same views that they had 
before the drafting of the resolution.
After the last of the explanatory speeches, the chair­
man called for a roll-call vote^ paragraph by paragraph, 
on the resolution proposed by the drafting committee. The 
entire resolution was adopted by the Political Committee 
with twenty-nine countries voting for, six against, and
la Ifeidfu, 612
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twenty abstaining*
Those countries voting for the resolution were:
BelgiumByelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Chile China CubaCzechoslovakiaDenmarkEcuadorEthiopiaFranceGuatemalaHaitiIcelandIndia
IranLiberiaLuxembourgMexicoNew ZealandNorwayPanamaPolandSwedenUnion of SovietSocialist Republics United Kingdom Uruguay Venezuela Yugoslavia
The six countries voting against the resolution were:
Argentina Costa Rica Dominican Republic
El SalvadorParaguayPeru
Those countries abstaining were;
AustraliaBoliviaBrazilCanadaColombiaBygptGreeceHondurasIraqLebanon
The NetherlandsNicaraguaPakistanPhilippine Republic Saudi Arabia Syria TurkeyUnion of South Africa United States Yemen
The significant result of the vote was noticed by 
Gromyko of the Soviet Union in expressing his regret that 
the United States, after voting for the resolution in 1946, 
refused to re-affirm it in 1947. Thus the United States 
was separating itself more and more from the Soviet policy
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d#dleated to dopoaine Franco In Spain* Tho Soviets accused 
the United States of protecting the American dollar in 
Spain and of sacrificing Its Ideals of freedom to achieve 
this protection. A likelier reason was that world events 
were dividing these former allies* and the United States 
was reluctant to help the Soviet Union destroy a potential 
ally* Events In 1950 and 1961 seem to prove that the United 
States would like Franco Spain for Its ally* (In 1950 the 
Republican leaders advised the Inclusion of Spain in the 
Atlantic Pact; In March* 1951* Oongress voted to include 
Spain In the Atlantic Pact; and In June* 1951* the Demo­
crats recommended the inclusion of Spain In the Atlantic 
Pact.)
The Political Qommittee sent Its report* with the res­
olution reaffirming the December 12* 1946* resolution* to 
the Oeneral Assembly* The Assembly Immediately placed the 
Spanish question on Its agenda* and on November 17* 1947* 
the president called for the Raonorteur to present his re­
port. The Rapporteur* Kaufman of Denmark* read the res­
olution proposed by the Political Committee. Since there 
had already been extensive debate on the matter In the 
committee* the number of speakers was limited* The mejor-
Records ^  A&-aembly. glftnary Meetings. $ & *  U *  November 13-29, I9 4 7 7 1 O8O.
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Ity of the speeches made were similar to those de­
livered In the Political Committee.
Klslev, of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
accused the United States and the United Kingdom of 
falling to cooperate In removing the vestiges of 
Nazism from Europe. Tho deelaratlons of the three great 
powers of the antl-Hltler coalition had Indicated their 
Intention of stamping out the remains of fascism in the 
world, but according to Klslev, the reactionary forces 
of the world were delaying this purge by giving every 
possible support to the fascist regimes in Spain, Port­
ugal, and Greece. The Spanish problem was closely link­
ed to the German problem, and he claimed that the western 
zones of Germany had not been purged of Nazis. The Nazi 
party was recovering from the first shock of defeat, 
and:
the monopolistic organizations which have sup­ported the Hitlerite regime and inspired Its aggression have not only not been liquidated, but are even being supported by the United States and the United Kingdom authorities. A number of Nazis cen still be found in respon­sible economic and administrative poets. We know from the Press that German reaction, with the support of reactionary forces in Great Britain and the United States Is trying to gather Its forces.
He maintained that this policy of the western powers In
Ibid.. 1087.
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Germany had had Its affect In Spain, and that the United 
States and Great Britain were actually protecting Franco* 
Klslev concluded his speech with a plea to the Assembly 
to strengthen Its action by adopting economic sanctions 
against Franco*
Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom del­
egatee replied to Klslev*s accusations, and the president 
of the Assembly was able to call for a vote, paragraph 
by paragraph. Whan the vote was completed. It showed 
that the second paragraph, the important section which 
reaffirmed the resolution celling for a recall of dip­
lomatic representatives, had failed to pass. The fJLrst 
paragraph, which merely acknowledged the Secretary-Gen­
eral *s report, was not even voted on. The third para­
graph, which expressed the confidence of the General 
Assembly in the Security Council, was easily adopted. 
Those countries which had refused to vote for the res­
olution included:
Argentina HondurasAustralia The NetherlandsBrazil NicaraguaCanada PeruCosta Rica Philippine RepublicDominican Republic TurkeyB1 Salvador Union of South AfricaGreece United Statesof America
lÈlAu. loss
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Despite this defeat* the Polish delegate still con­
sidered that the recommendation of December 12, 1946, was 
in force, end he was supported by a number of other 
delegates. This caused the representative from Argentine 
to:
point out that events have shown that here it is not a matter of promoting international peace and security but simply a matter of polities, other­wise how could it happen that when this Assembly refuses to re-affirm the resolution adopted last year with respect to the Charter, there are still representatives who consider that that resolution still stands.^’®
The resolution of December, 1946 was gradually 
losing its effectiveness. It had received the accept­
ance of all but one of the fifty-five nations in Dec­
ember, 1946. Bow the United Bâtions, one year later, 
refused to re-affirm it. However this refusal was 
nothing more than a moral repudiation of the resolution, 
and the resolution was still binding (if a recommendation 
can be considered as binding). Bven the countries that 
had voted against the re-affirmation did not send am­
bassadors to Madrid (with the exception of SI Salvador). 
There was no time limit in the resolution, nor was there 
any stipulation that it had to be re-affirmed. The 
Polish delegate was probably correct in his contention 
that it was still in force. But the force of the re­
solution was lessened considerably, and since the re-
lilÆi.. 10»8
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fiolutioD in the first piece had been only a recommenda­
tion, It now seemed lively that some nations would no 
longer follow it.
The United States voted for the resolution us a whol< 
after the section whieh would have re-affIrmed the Decem­
ber 12 resolution had been rejected. But it was evident 
that the split between the Allies and the Soviet Union 
had made the United States wary of voting for any meas­
ures against Franco, and it was becoming bolder in its 
efforts to protect this potential ally. Whether the 
forces of reaction were gathering their strength, as 
the Soviet Union claimed, or whether a number of other 
countries shared the United States view that the Soviet 
Union was fast becoming a worse menace than Franco, the 
niUBber of countries opposing the adoption of harsh meas­
ures against Franco was increasing. Would the members 
of the United Natl one comply with the resolution of De­
cember 18, 1946 after the General Assembly had refused 
to re-affirm it?
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Chapter VI» Franco gets a Pardon
In Koveahar, 1947, the United Nations failed to re­
affirm the December 12, 1946, resolution recommending a 
"break" in diplomatic relations with Franco Spain. The 
failure to re-affirm the resolution was taken by some of 
the members to mean a revocation of It, and El Salvador 
accredited a minister to Madrid*
As a result, a situation was created whieh put some 
of the member nations which had not sent dlplcmatic rep^ 
resentatlves to Spain in a disadvantageous position, since 
they had no representatives in Madrid to look after their 
interests# There were two main points of view on how to 
remedy the situation. One faction, led by the Soviet 
Union, wanted to adopt a resolution strong enouj^ to leave 
no doubt in the minde of the member states of the United 
Nations as to what course they should pursue in regards to 
Spain# The other group, led by the United States, wanted 
a resolution passed the United Nations which would al­
low the members themselves decide what relations they 
should have with the Franco regime»
Both sides, as a result of this situation, wanted the 
Spanish question to be re-introduced In the Ueneral Assem­
bly# It was re-introduced at the 140th Plenary Meeting, 
on Septembei^ 84, 1948, by the Polish delegate, Lange, who 
asked the ACsembly to remedy the situation in Spain by
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adopting a resolution strong enough to bring about the 
collapse of the Franco regime* The General Assembly re* 
ferred the matter to the First Oommittee on Political and 
Security Questions, along with all the previous resolutions 
adopted by the United Nations on the Spanish question# 
Because of a full agenda, the committee did not take 
up the question until its 256th meeting on May 4, 1949# 
Julnlsy Kats-Suchy of Poland introduced the problem by 
reminding the members of the history of the Spanish ques­
tion in the United Nations and reviewing the December 12, 
1946, resolution recommending a recall of ambassadors and 
ministers from Madrid# He recapitulated the record of the 
Franco regime and claimed that the United States and the 
United Kingdom wanted Spain admitted to the United Nations. 
The United States economic ascendency in Spain and the 
military missions of the United States in Spain were cited 
by the Polish delegate as examples of the attempt made by 
^ e  United States to sustain the Franco regime# He quoted 
several American newspaper articles which stated that the 
United States should settle the Spanish question to Its 
advantage# The Washington Sunday Star, he said, stated
that the enemy was not Franco Spain but the U.S.S.R., and
!that the latter should not be permitted to stop the United 
States from settling the Spanish question to its own ad­
vantage# and not as the Soviet Union dictated in the United
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Nations.^ i
Katz«*Sueh}r maintalnad that the United States was doing 
everything in its power to have the December 18, 1946, res­
olution revoked, and he pointed out that the United States 
had re-established normal fInanelal relations with Franco 
by unfreezing $69,000,000 worth of Spanish assets in the 
United States. He claimed that the attitude of the west­
ern democracies was helping to keep Franco In power, and 
he pleaded with the committee to follow its own conscience 
and not the dictates of the United States. There were two 
questions to answer, he said. (1) Had any of the basic 
features of the Franco regime disappeared^ (8) Why had 
the"United Nations failed to help the Spanish people set 
up a democratic government and become eligible for member­
ship? He stated that the answer to both questions was that 
the United Nations had been too weak in its dealings with 
Spain, and he asked the Gosmittee to adopt a resolution 
which would place the United Nations on the side of democ­
racy and not fascism*
Jaoeo Oar 1 os liunniz of Brazil, arguing that the Decem­
ber 12 resolution cabling for a "break" in diplomatic re­
lations had not bey6 re-affirmed in 1947, said that some 
 — ---------
^ United Natjq## (^jficial the General Assem-
WtJL* SftSSiEâft-SÊ' thmr.-rirat ± , 1949. 2.
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of the members had taken this action to mean a revocation 
of the resolution. He submitted a draft resolution on the 
behalf of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and his own country 
which he hoped would remedy the situation. The résolu» 
tion read as follows:
The Ceneral Assembly,
Ooneidering that, during its second session in 1947, a proposal Intended to confirm the reso­lution of December 12, 1946, on the political regime in power in Spain failed to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the votes cast;
Considering that certain governments have in­terpreted the negative vote of 1947 as virt­ually revoking the clause in the previous reso­lution which recommended the withdrawal of heads of mission with the rank of ambassador or minis­ter plenipotentiary accredited to the Spanish Covernment;
Considering that, in view of the doubt regard­ing the validity of this interpretation, other governments have continued to refrain from accrediting heads of mission to Madrid, there­by creating inequality to their disadvantage;
Considering that such confusion may diminish the prestige of the United Hâtions which all Members of the Organization have a particular interest in preserving;
Considering that in any event the 1946 reso­lution does not prescribe the breaking of political and economic relations with the Spanish Government which have been the sub­ject of bilateral agreements, are between the governments of several Member States and the Madrid Government;
Considering that in the negotiation of such agreements, governments which have complied with the recommendation of December 12, 1946, are placed In a position of inequality which works to the disadvantage of economically
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weaker governments;
DBGIDES,,without prejudice to the declarations contained In the resolution of December 12, 1946,I to leave Member states full freedom of action as regards their diplomatic relations with Spain*^
Uunnlz was supported in his contentions by the dele-j :gate from Pena, Belaunde, who also based hia argument on
.. ' -the principle of non-intervention* But after contending' ' ithat the December 12, 1946, resolution had been a failure,
Belaunde was assailed by the Polish delegate, who replied:
for the first time In the history of the United Nations, a plea for fascism, murder and terror has been heard. A Government which has the death of thousands on its conscience has been praised by the representative from Peru, who had not taken any part in the war in which Franco Spain had contributed to the sufferings of Europe.^
Belaunde protested against the accusation which the Polish 
delegate had made. In no way, he asserted, had Peru approv­
ed of the Franco regime, but he asked:
.r ' 'could It not be retorted that millions of persons have also perished as vlclms of Injustice in other parts of the world?*
The debate was waxing hot and heavy between these two 
delegations when the meeting adjourned, and by the time the 
committee reconvened on May 5, 1949, tempers had somewhat 
cooled. The first speaker at this meeting was Arbelaez of
g Ibid. . 649.
3 Ibid.. 177.
* Ibid.. 178.
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of Colombia who pleaded for the adoption of the join res­
olution allowing the members freedom of action as far as 
Spain was concerned on the grounds that the December 12, 
1940, resolution constituted intervention in the domestic 
affairs of Spain*
He was followed by the Polish delegate who announced 
that he was going to introduce hie own resolution because 
the joint resolution introduced by Brazil was much too 
weak* Lange claimed that his resolution would lead to 
the overthrow of the Musaolini-Hltler-imposed government 
in Spain* He alleged that the joint resolution Introduced 
by Brazil at long last brought out into the open the long 
hidden desire to admit Franco Spain to the United Hâtions,^ 
Also, he expressed hope that the General Assembly vrould 
adopt the Polish resolution which stated that:
The General Assembly;
Recommends that all members of the United Nations should as a first step cease to export to Spain arms and amunition as well as all warlike end strategic material;
Recommends that all members of the United Nations should refrain from entering into any agreements or treaties with Franco Spain both formally and de facto.'
Gromyko of the Soviet Union who spoke in favor of the
® ifeiis., 647. 
® Ibid.. 648. 
’ Ibid.. 649.
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Polish resolution, reealled that tho problem of relations 
with Franco Spain had been under discussion since the 
organization had been founded. He reviewed the history 
of the Spanish question and stated that it was owing to 
the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom 
that the Assembly*a resolution had not been Implemented 
and that these two countries had only supported the 1946 
resolution to satisfy public oplhlon* He claimed that the 
real attitude of these two governments now was quite dlf^ 
ferent and that the United States support of the Franco 
Government was taking the form of political, economic, and 
financial aid# He recounted his version of United States** 
Spanish financial relations after the war and accused the 
Ihilted States of supporting France by sending raw materials 
to Spain#®
Gromyko, In accusing the United States of bolstering 
Its trade relations with Spain, also asserted that It was 
a purpose of the United States government to utilize Spain 
as a military base "In the war that Is being hatched against 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.Gromyko further 
claimed that the policy of governing circles In the United 
States and the United Kingdom was to support the Spanish 
government and to encourage the fascist clique In Spain
® Ibid.. 197. 
» Ibid.. 198.
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and Germany which slrcady were asking for admission to 
the fwestern Suropean union** (North Atlantic Pact). The 
Soviet delegate believed that it was the Assembly * s re­
sponsibility "to seek ways and means to re-establish de­
mocracy in Spain so that the Spanish people might event­
ually find a worthy place in the United N a t i o n # ; "^0 (This 
was a departure from Soviet policy of the summer of 1946 
when the Soviet Union believed that such was the responsi­
bility of the Security Council*)
The other members of the Soviet bloc followed the same 
line of argument, claiming that the Franco*regime was being 
protected by the Anglo-American countries. Hoffmeister of 
Useehoslovakia, Kislev of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Tarasenko of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re­
public, and Kats-Suchy of Poland all claimed that the United 
States was plotting a war against the Soviet Union and that 
the United States had concluded military and economic agree­
ments with Spain as a part of this plot. But while they 
presented no proof of these contentions, they urged the 
United Nations to do something about the Franco regime in 
spite of the United States.
The Polish resolution was also supported by France and 
Mexico, but their arguments differed from those of the
Ibia.. 801. 
Ibid,. 238.
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Soviet Union. Tbey were more prone to anti-Franco 
preestir© In their home countries than most of the mem­
bers. Mexico was sensitive to public opinion, because 
Mexico City wee the meeting place of and a haven for 
the exiled Spanish Communist Party and the Republican 
government. Prance vas influenced by the strong, po­
litically powerful labor unions In Prance which were 
constantly pressing upon the government the necessity 
of opposing the Franco regime.
The opposition to the Polish resolution was headed 
by the United States and the United Kingdom delegates. 
This opposition group believed that complete freedom of 
action for the member states on the question of diplo­
matic relations with Spain was of prime importance If 
the prestige of the United Nations were to be saved.
This group Included Bolivie, Argentina, Ecuador, India,
The Netherlands, Domini can Republic, China, Peru, Colom-
12bia, Sygpt, El Salvador, and Siam* The delegates of 
these states still based their opposition on the grounds 
that the resolution of December 12 recommending a recall 
of ministers from Spain had been a failure and that It 
violated the established principles of non-intervention 
contained in the Charter. Ray Atherton of the United 
States denied Soviet charges that the United States had
ifeld., 2se.
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concluded military agreements with Spain, but he did
not deny that dismantled equipment of German factories
1 3was being shipped to Spain,
When Atherton had finished, the last speaker, Cas­
tro of El Salvador, summed up the arguments against the 
Polish resolution, stating that he was opposed to the 
resolution because:
(1) The consequences of the proposal would be especially prejudicial to the Spanish people;
(2) The proposal might encourage the Spanish people to over throw their government, thus causing more bloodshed in Spain;
(3) As there was no evidence of foreign inter­vention in Spain at that time the S|>ani8h people were in a position to express their desires as they had when they overthrew the Monarchy and established the Republic;
(4) The collective pressure of the United Nations to bring about a change of government in Spain would constitute an intervention in the domes­tic affairs of a country, in violation of Art­icle 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter;
(5) The Polish proposal attempted to confirm reso­lution 39(1} of 1946, which envisaged the application of coercive measures, would lead the General Assembly to enroach on the powers of the Security Council,*'
Castro was the last of the speakers, and the chair­
man was able to bring the two proposals, the Polish and 
the joint Latin-American, to a vote. The Latin-Ameri- 
can proposal was voted on first, and adopted by a vote
13 Ibid., 200. 
Ibid., 238.
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of twenty-five to sixteen^ with sixteen abstentions.
16Those states voting for the proposal were:
Argentina NicaraguaBolivia PakistanBrazil ParaguayColombia PeruDomlnloan Republic Philippine RepublicEcuador Saudi ArabiaEl Salvador SlamBygpt SyriaGreece TurkeyHonduras Union of South AfricaIraq VenezuelaLebanon YemenLiberia
1ÔThose states voting against the resolution were:
Australia PanamaByelorussian Soviet Social- Poland1st Republic Ukrainian Soviet Soclal-Costa Rica 1st RepublicCzechoslovakia Union of Soviet Soclal-Denmark 1st RepublicsMexico UruguayNew Zealand YugoslaviaNorway
17Those states abstaining were:
Afghanistan HaitiBelgium IcelandBurma LuxembourgCanada The NetherlandsChile SwedenChina United KingdomPrance United States
After the Latin-Amerloan resolution had been adopted* the
committee rejected the Polish resolution* thirty-one to
15 840
16 Ibid.. 240
17 Ibid.. 241
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eleven, with sixteen abstentions. Those countries yot-
18ing for the resolution were:
Byelorussian Soviet Social­ist Republic Gzeohoslovakia Franc e Guatemala Mexico PolandUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Yugoslavia
19Those states voting against the resolution were:
Argentina LiberiaBolivia LuxembourgBrazil NetherlandsCanada NicaraguaColombia NorwayDenmark PakistanDominican Republic ParaguayEcuador PeruB1 Salvador SwedenBygpt SyriaGreece TurkeyHonduras Union of South AfricaIceland United KingdomIraq United StatesLebanon
20Those states abstaining were:
Afghanistan CubaAustralia BSâSiiopiaBurma HaitiChile IndiaCosta Rica Iran
lÈiât, 241. 
IfeiSl, , 241. 
Ibid. , 240.
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Hew Zealand SiamPhilippine Republic UruguaySaudi Arabia Venezuela
From the First Committee^ the Latin-American reaolu-
tion was presented to Assembly on May 11 ̂ 1949. The' Î
question was not opened for di sous si on at that time, but 
the rapporteur.Salim Saiper of Turkey, read the resolu­
tion* ̂  On May 18, 1949, the Assembly discussed the reso­
lution, and the delegates in the Assembly expressed the
same views on the Latin-American proposal as they had in
the Political Committee. When the measure canw up for a 
vote, the states grouped themselves as they had in the 
committee, with twenty-six voting for the resolution, 
fifteen against, and sixteen abstaining. This vote had 
been enou^ to pass the resolution in the Political Com­
mittee where only a simple majority vote was needed but 
the resolution was defeated in the Assembly, because it 
did not receive the votes of at least two-thirds of the 
members (abstentions are counted as negative votes). Nev­
ertheless, the fact that it received the votes of the ma­
jority of the members of the United Nations was interpret­
ed by many delegations to mean a revocation of the Decem-
81ber 12, 1946 resolution.
Many members thought that this would be the end of 
the Spanish question, but it was not. On Tuesday, Septem-
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ber 19, 1950, the question of relations of member 
states of the United Nations with Spain was placed on 
the Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of theggFifth Session. It was placed on this list at the re­
quest of the delegate of the Dominican Republic who 
claimed that new evidence showed that the members of the 
United Nations should have complete freedom of action 
in regard to diplomatic relations with Spain. This meant 
that the question would come up for discussion before the 
Ad Hoc Political Oomodttee. This committee placed the 
question on its agenda on October 88, 1950, and it was 
discussed at six meetin%s. The arguments for a change 
in the December 12, 1946, resolution were the same as 
they had always been. They were best expressed by Secre­
tary Acheson who clainmd that the withdrawal of ambassa­
dors from Spain as a means of political pressure was a 
departure from established principle. He stated that it 
was traditional practice, once a state was formally recogn­
ized, to exchange ambassadors without political signifi­
cance. Said Ache8on:
At the Ninth International Oonference of American States in Bogota, this principle was incorporated in Resolution 35 which states in part that "the establishment or maintenance of diplomatic rela­tions with a government does not imply any judge­ment upon the domestic policy of that government." However, the withdrawal of ambassadors from Spain
go "Supplementary Agenda of the Fifth Session",Journal of the United Nations. September 19, 1950, 4.
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disregarded this principle. By attaching moral significance to the refusal to maintain full dip­lomatic relations with Spain, this action has also implied moral significance to the maintenance of full diplomatic relations to confusion in public opinion both here and abroad* Public bewilderment has been increased over the inconsistency of ac­crediting ambassadors to such countries as those in Eastern Europe whose regimes we do not condone, while at the same time refusing to appoint an am­bassador to Spain.
Other delegations were of the same opinion. To accom­
plish their goal (a change in the December 12, 1946, reso­
lution) Bolivia, Qosta Rica, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippine Republic, 
and Peru submitted a draft resolution.
The Soviet bloc delegates opposed this resolution 
for the same reasons they had opposed the joint Latin- 
American resolution of 1949, again accusing the United 
States of protecting Franco and even of concluding mili­
tary agreements with Spain. This time the United States 
delegation vigorously denied all Soviet charges. Pabregat 
of Uruguay also disagreed with Acheson. He announced 
that he would not support the resolution, because if it 
were passed by the General Assembly, Franco would count 
"this approval as one of his greatest victories."
ss "United States Policy toward Spain" Department of State. Press Release. January 19, 1950, No. 64, 3.
24 United Natione Official Records of the General Assembly. Summary records of the Ad Hoe Political Commit- tee. October 86, 1960, 3.
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A number of countries that gave their support to the 
resolution (which was only one paragraph long, allowing 
members of the United Nations full freedom of action in 
regards to Spain) took Issue with the former United Na­
tions action on the grounds that It had constituted an 
intervention In the Internal affairs of a country. This
pKnew resolution would rectify that mistake.
The resolution was put to a vote on November 1, 1950, 
and the Hoe Political Committee adopted the resolution 
by roll call, thirty-seven to ten, with only the members 
of the Russian bloc and Uruguay, Ghlle, Mexico, and France 
voting against the resolution. The resolution and the 
Ad Hoc Political Committee's report were then read to 
the General Assembly on November 4, 1950, by rapporteur 
of the A^ Hoe Committee. Rule sixty-seven of the General 
Assembly allows the president to put to a vote the ques­
tion "whether the General Assembly considers discussion 
of the report to be necessary." The president followed 
this rule, and the Assembly decided that the report and 
the resolution of the Hoc Political Committee on the 
Spanish question were not to be discussed, by thirty- 
three voted to five, with fifteen abstentions.
25 Ibid.. 1-8. 
Ibid., 4.
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The resolution proposed by the Committee was then put 
to a vote and adopted thirty-eight to ten, with twelve 
abstentions.
Thus, the end came rather quietly, and when the Span­
ish question appeared In the General Assembly for the last 
time, the Assembly did not even feel that It was necessary 
to discuss the recommendations of the Political Committee 
as it had done so often before. The working part of the 
1946 resolution, or as it was officially known resolution 
39(1), which in essence recommended that the members re­
call their ministers and ambassadors from Madrid, was re­
voked.
, ; ;
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Summation and Oonclusion
Every great war leaves many problems in its wake, 
both to the victor and to the vanquished. World War 
II was no exception, and the Spanish question was one 
of the most Important. It can be called a problem left 
by the war, because before Hitler invaded Poland, there 
was little evidence of any concern expressed by the gov­
ernments of the United States or the United Kingdom 
whether Franco ruled Spain or not. The United Kingdom, 
along with France, previously had destroyed all attempts 
by the Spanish Republican government to solicit aid from 
the League of Nations during the Spanish Civil War. Brit­
ish ships of the International Naval Patrol, perhaps as 
the Republican government claimed, had been blinded by 
the "dense fog of their own stacks" and allowed Mussolini 
to apply his own interpretation of the Leagues "Withdraw­
al Plan," an interpretation which had involved the gather­
ing of the Italian sick from Franco's armies, marching 
them past the League of Nations "counters," shipping them 
to Naples, and then shipping fresh troops back overseas 
to Spanish battlefields. (In 1938 Italy had 110,000 men 
in Spain, according to the League of Nations "counters" 
between 30,000 and 40,000 Italians "most of them sickly" 
had withdrawn, yet in 1939 after the fall of Madrid, there 
were,still over 100;000 Italians in Spain.)
The United State:; government, undaunted by public opin-
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Ion, as expressed In resolutions of labor unions, church 
councils and liberal associations, had contributed to 
the Franco cause by refusing to recognize either side as 
a belligerent and by proclaiming the ^Neutrality Act" of 
1937 which worked to the advantage of the rebel govern­
ment. This neutrality act had allowed either side to 
operate on a "cash and carry" basis, and as Franco con­
trolled most of the ports of entry the Republican govern­
ment largely had been cut off from American supplies.
Soviet Russia which, for its own purposes and not 
from any altrusitic motivation and apparently to thwart 
German and Italian ambition in Spain, had given its sup­
port to the Popular Front government, a government which 
at the start of the war had not one Communist cabinet 
member but which was decidedly under the Communist banner 
at the and of the war. (Soviet Russia had stipulated 
that all quartermaster corps and all logistic corps had 
to be under the orders of a communist party member, or 
no more aid would be shipped from the Soviet Union. There­
fore, the communists were able completely to control the 
Republican government in Spain.)
However, Russian aid had come too late and had been 
insignificant compared to the men and materials sent by 
Germany and Italy. Franco thus owed a debt to Hitler 
for his victory in the Civil War, and Hitler tried to
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build this debt Into a wartime alliance• Prom the ma­
terial submitted by the member states and the Investigat­
ing committees of the United Nations, there can be little 
doubt that Hitler succeeded In creating this alliance. 
(Franco admitted that Spain was a member of the Axis, and 
Spain had concluded several agreements with Germany that 
seemed to put Franco on the Axis s i d e . T h e r e  la a 
great deal of evidence to support the contention that 
Franco was an active member of the conspiracy to wage 
war against the group of countries now known as the Unit­
ed Nations. (For Instance Franco had seized Tangier In 
1940 In violation of international statute and had en­
gaged with Germany In planning and training for the jointgconquest of Gibraltar.) According to the sub-committee 
of the Security Council, which quoted from telegrams of
Franco to Hitler, It was part of the plot that Spain
3should enter the war at the most opportune time.
The group of nations, now known as the United Na­
tions, alternately has built up and destroyed a strong
United Nations Official Records of the Security Council. Report or the Special Sub-Committee on the Span­ish Question. 4. (qdoted from a report submitted to the sub-committee from t̂ ie United States Intelligence Service)
^ Ihld., 1-30. (quoted from captured German war docu­ments submitted by the Allies).
^ Ibid., 8.
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oese against the Franco regime. This ease created by 
the United Nations contained sections which were very 
strong legally and sections which seemed to have no 
substantiation whatsoever In International law.
The Spanish question was one of the first questions 
to be considered by the United Nations. The Panama reso­
lution, recommending that the members of the United Na­
tions use the Potsdam declaration as a guide for their 
future diplomatic relations with Spain was perfectly 
compatible with the provisions of the Charter, for it 
merely excluded Franco Spain frc»a admission to the Unit­
ed Nations. The United Nations can exclude any nation 
which does not, in its judgement, possess the necessary 
qualifications for membership.
The adoption of the Panama resolution proved that the 
western Allies and the Soviet Union were still on fairly 
good terms in 1945 and that they were in perfect accord 
about one thing in 1946: that Franco Spain should not be­
come a member of the United Nations. Soviet Russia, how­
ever, wanted to do more than merely denounce the Spanish 
government. But, as the Spanish Embassy claimed, "along
4came Anglo-American caution," and the Issue was postponed. 
Because the Allies were afraid of precipitating another
^ "Wheels Within Wheels", Diplomatic Information Office of Spain. Spanish Embassy, 1946, 16.
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elvil war In Spain» they contented themselves with a 
verbal condemnation of the Franco regime.
In the summer of 1946» the Spanish question was in­
troduced in the Security Council by a member of the Soviet 
bloc. Oscar Lange of Poland requested the Security Coun­
cil to examine the situation in Spain under the authority 
of Article S» paragraph 6, of the Charter of the United 
Nations which provides that the United Nations shall in­
sure that states not members of the United Nations shall 
act in accordance with the principles of the organization. 
It is not clear what the legal position of this section 
of the Charter is under the principles of international 
law. One line of reasoning seems to establish that this 
paragraph of the Charter does not conform to the estab­
lished principles of international law» because the Char­
ter» in reality a multi-lateral treaty, binds» like other 
treaties» the signatory parties.
The Security Council did not question the jurisdic­
tion of the United Nations under the interpretation of 
Article S. But it did express a doubt as to whether the 
United Nations had a legal right to pass a resolution 
calling for measures similar to those asked for in the 
Polish resolution. Some delegates believed that United 
Nations action on the situation in Spain would consti­
tute intervention in a matter essentially domestic, and
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the Charter forblcle aetion by the United Nations on any 
subject within the jurisdiction of an individual state.
(It is the opinion of this writer that the basic failure 
of the United Nations to correct the situation in Spain 
is to be found in this article. The makers of the Char­
ter, in over a hundred articles, gave the new organiza­
tion defined powers and then took them all away with this 
single paragraph.)
In the case of the Polish resolution, jurisdiction 
was sought under the authority of Articles 34 and 36 
which allow the Security Council to deal with any situa­
tion threatening international security. The Special 
Sub-Committee appointed by the Security Council to ex­
amine the Spanish situation found that the situation in 
Spain was "a situation the continuance of which might 
threaten the maintenance of international peace." There­
fore, the sub-committee decided that the Security Coun­
cil could claim some jurisdiction over the Spanisdi ques­
tion. However, the sub-committee held that the measures 
called for in the Polish resolution under the authority 
of Articles 40 and 41 would not be legal, since the Franco 
regime at the moment of proposed action was not a threat 
to international peace. The sub-committee, therefore, 
proposed that the Security Council refer the question to 
the General Assembly, along with the report of the sub­
committee. It was believed by the majority of the members
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of the Security Council that aince the aub-comalttee 
proposal recommended the recall of the heads of the 
diplomatic missions In Madrid, all of the members of the 
United Nations should have a chance to express their opin­
ion of the proposed action.
The Polish resolution was amended and revised by the 
Security Council until almost nothing remained of the o- 
riglnal proposal. As a result, the only two countries 
that did not vote for the resolution were Poland end the 
Soviet Union, and the measure was not adopted. These two 
eoimtries, Poland and the Soviet Union, were afraid that 
the Ceneral Assembly in acting on the question would gain 
in prestige and power to the detriment of the Security 
Council. The Soviet Union wanted the Security Council 
to make every important decision, because it was possible 
to control the decisions of the Security Council through 
the use of the veto. The Soviet Union was not afraid 
that the Ceneral Assembly would pass a resolution favor­
able to the Franco regime, but that In passing such a 
resolution a precedent would be set which at some later 
time might work to the disadvantage of Soviet interests.
However, the Polish delegation later Introduced the 
very measure which enabled the Security Council to delete 
the question from the list of matters It had under obser­
vation, thus making It possible for the General Assembly
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to place the Spanish question on Its agenda. The Soviet 
Union had decided that the Security Council would never 
settle the Spanish question to Soviet satisfaction. Ap­
parently the Soviet Union hoped that the possible loss 
of power by the Security Council would be more than com­
pensated for by United Nations action In the General 
Assembly leading to the fall of the Franco regime.
The polish delegation led the attack on Franco Spain 
In the Political Committee of the General Assembly, to 
which It was referred by the Assembly. Poland was a mem­
ber of the special sub*^comalttee which drafted the well- 
known resolution 39(1) of December IS, 1946. This reso­
lution recommended that the members of the United Nations 
recall from Madrid their accredited ambassadors and minis­
ters. It also recommended that Franco Spain be excluded 
from membership In all the specialized agencies set up 
by the United Nations.
When some of the delegations referred to resolution 
39(1), they commonly Interpreted It as calling for a 
break In diplomatic relations with Spain. This was a 
false assumption. In reocmmendlng that the heads of the 
diplomatic missions to Spain be recalled, the resolution 
In no way disrupted the flow of business between the Span­
ish government and the various embassies. The McMahon 
affair" was proof of this contention. It was conducted
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In its entirety* without the presence of an American 
ambassador* by a chargé d'affaires*^
This resolution, 39(1), was followed completely by 
the specialized agencies of the United Nations. But It 
is possible that the exclusion of Franco Spain from such 
agencies as the International Givil Aviation Organization 
and the World Health Organization placed undue hardship 
on the Spanish people and did no material harm to the Franco 
regime* It was argued that the resolution as a whole enabled 
Franco to unite the Spanish people behind him* Franco was 
able, apparently, to eonvinde many Spaniards who had prev­
iously been opposed to him that Resolution 39(1) recommend­
ed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain.
The weakness of the resolution, then, was that it did
^ The Spanish government withdrew press credentials from Dr* Francis KcMahon, a correspondent In Spain for the New York Post* The Spanish foreign minister wrote a note (April 14^ 1947) stating that the only reason Dr* NcNkihon had been permitted to enter Spain in the first place was because the American Bmbassy had intervened in his favor.He also claimed that during the six months Dr. McMahon had been in Spain he had enjoyed full and complete freedom to circulate throughout Spanish territory and to send in his articles without hindrance. Mr* Phillip Bonsai, the United States cheu*gé d'affaires in Madrid, answered the letter on April 28, 1947, and expressed his regret that the Spanish government had acted the way it had* He also stated that this action by the Spanish government constituted a revo­cation of the polfcy of granting to foreign correspondents freedom from control and censorship. The Spanish govern­ment reconsidered its action, and fuller freedom was grant­ed to correspondents in Spain.
United litf1 I lelease No. 372 of
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no't go far enough* The members of the United Nations 
(except the Soviet bloc) hesitated to take more drastic 
aetion for fear of bringing to the Spanish people the hard­
ships of another civil war* Also, apparently, the fear of 
the western Allies that a change in the Spanish government 
would give the communists a chance to seize power in Spain 
caused them to support the Franco regime. A western world, 
perhaps soon to be at war with the Soviet Union could not 
afford to have the strategic Iberian Peninsula in unsympa­
thetic hands.® Again (as during the Spanish civil war) the 
two governments were opposed to harsh action. They pre* 
ferred to pursue a gentler course with Franco, to try to 
persuade him to adopt democratic methods and institutions 
as would enable Spain eventually to become a member of the 
United Nations.
Despite the opposition of some of the members of the 
United Nations to the resolution 39(1) recommending a re­
call of ambassadors from Madrid, once the resolution had 
been adopted, the United Nations did comply with the res­
olution with the exception of ArgAntina.^ Nevertheless,
® Ghurehill has pointed out that whoever controls Spain controls the Straits as the importance of Ulbraltar and all "pinpoint” bases was decreased with the easy fall of Sing­apore. The strength tpdajT Is in depth, and if Bur ope were overrun, the Pyrenees Would be the last barrier*
^ At least no nation (except Argentina) accredited a new ambassador to Spain.
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m#r# anti mar# of th« membara oppoaad tba raoalllng of 
«hoir amhaaoadiw# and mlnlatora. World avant a wera oaua~ 
ing tha amallar atotoo to awing into tha woatarn orbit, 
snail atataa traditionally oaoillata from ono aida to tha 
othar in an international organisation where no neutral­
ity i# poaaibla on a vota taken on an important maaaura. 
During thia **anarganoy,** tha agwll powara, noting tha 
woraaning of raleticm» batwaan tha Soviet Union and tha 
United State», ahoaa tha United State», probably an tha 
laaear of two evil». (In 19S0, after the attook on South 
Korea, ten of the aamll powers ahangad their opinions on 
tha Spanish question to eonforot to the view held by tha 
United States.)
Am a result of the growing opposition to the resell 
resolution, when tha sponsors of the resolution attempted 
to have it re-affirmed in 1947, the majority of tha mem­
bers of tha Uanarml Assembly voted for a proposal witioh if 
it had bean adopted would have abrogated the oonditions of 
tha re sail resolution. Although the measure reoaivad tha 
majority of the votes oast, it did not reoeive th* neaes- 
sary two*thirds to oarry it. Nevertheless, beoause tha 
majority of the members of the Assembly had favored full 
freedom of notion in regard to diplomatie relations wich 
Spain, many of the members ware of the opinion that the 
resail resolution of 194d had been annulled.
However, aeaording to the rules and prooadura of the
1 1 8
General Assembly, the legal status of the recall reso­
lution was quite clear. It remained In force, since no 
direct action was tfiKen to repeal It. The situation after 
this failure to re-affirm the resolution In 1947 left some 
of the members of the United Nations In an awkward position. 
The members of the United Ration® which had recalled their 
ambassadors from Madrid were left without an official to 
represent them at state functions, causing 0 loss of pres­
tige*
In 1949, an attempt was made to remedy this situation 
by adopting a resolution, celled the LatIn-Amerlean reso­
lution, to permit members of the United Nations full dip­
lomatic freedom with Spain. But the measure failed to 
receive the necessary two-thirds vote and was not adopted. 
Sven so, this resolution showed that the "conservative** 
states (conservative in regard to action against Spain) 
were gaining in strength. It seemed to be only a matter 
of time until the recall resolution would be revoked.
This assumption was correct, end when the Ad Hoc Po­
litical Committee examined the Spfnlsh question In 1950, 
the members of ^he committee adopted e resolution recom­
mending that the members of the United Rations be allowed 
full freedom of action toward Spain. Then the committee 
presented its reBolut"*ion to the General Assembly, It was 
not even discussed but was quickly adopted by a roll call
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vote*
Ae e result, the United Nations attitude toward Spain 
in 1950 rae similar to its attitude toward Spain in 1946* 
In 1960, as in 1946, the offleial policy of the United 
Nations prohibited Franco Spain from becoming a member of 
the United Nations and has condemned the Franco regime, 
but has done absolutely nothing more to correct the situ­
ation in Spain* (The revocation of the 1946 resolution 
in October, 1960, ml#it even be termed as an "epology" to 
the Franco regime, or as the delegate from Poland said, 
"one of his greatest victories.")
In reviewing the Spanish question before the United 
Nations, several questions present themselves* Did the 
United Nations pursue a legal course of ection in hand­
ling the Spanish question? The answer seems to be no.
By the terms of the Charter (Article 2, paragraph 7, which 
states that all members of the United Nations must refrain 
from interfering in matters that are essentially within 
thé»domestic control of a state,) its course of action 
was not legal. According to Webster, who provides the 
simplest definition of international intervention:
an intervention is the interference of e. state 
in the affairs of another state for the purpose 
of compelling the state to forbear doing certain acts or altering the conditions of its domestic affaire irrespejctlve of its will.
This is what the United Nations, or at least some pf the
1^0
members, wanted to do; to alter the condition of Spain’s 
domestic affairs Irrespective of Spain’s will* And be­
cause the Charter forbids the United Nations to intervene, 
the measures tried by the United Nations seem to have been 
Illegal.
It was argued by some of the supporters of the United 
Nations action that practical considerations forced the 
United Nations to Interpret the Charter in a different 
way. They have argued that the activities of the Franco 
regime created a threat to international peade, and there­
fore any action necessary to remedy the situation was legal 
according to the Charter. This contention would have been 
true If the activities of the Franco regime did create a 
threat to the peace, for the primary purpose of the United 
Nations Is to preserve the peace, and the Security Council 
may take any measures It considers necessary to preserve 
this peace. However, upon reconsideration, it is found 
that this premise is not true ; the United Nations own "in­
vestigation, " by Its special sub-committee, found that the 
situation in Hpain did not create a threat to international 
peace. Therefore, the United Nations could not take any 
action to remedy the situation in Spain.
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